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External stakeholders are becoming increasingly involved in mine design and permitting 
decision-making. Yet, the systems in which mining investment decisions take place do not fully 
capture the importance of stakeholder influence on the success or failure of a mining venture. 
Conventional mine planning and permitting methods elevate technical expertise, conventional 
views of risk management, and financial justifications as the drivers of “objective” decision 
making. The rising influence of external stakeholders to mining project outcomes means that 
stakeholder attitudes on mining, and institutional trust, and local environmental knowledge 
must be integrated into the decision-making systems in more comprehensive ways. This 
dissertation is a compilation of three research papers which seek to answer the following 
research questions:  
1. How can governments better integrate local communities’ perceptions and concerns into 
mine permitting decisions?  
2. What are the most important indicators of company-stakeholder conflict? 
3. How does stakeholder opposition affect the valuation of a mining property? 
This dissertation informs these questions with three research activities:  
A case study of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) at the Donlin Gold project 
in Western Alaska: The National Environmental Policy Act requires US regulators to consult 
local stakeholders and include their concerns in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). At 
the Donlin project in Western Alaska, the Army Corps of Engineers included Alaskan Native 
tribes as cooperating agencies in the analysis in addition to conventional public comment 
meeting. This attempt at improved stakeholder involvement had some successes, but it also 
highlights divergent goals within NEPA and a lack of trust between local stakeholders and 
regulators. Tribes were able to push for examination and disclosure of some of their 
environmental concerns but remain frustrated with NEPA’s limitations with respect to 
transform findings into enforceable protections. 
A statistical examination of the social and environmental variables as indicators of 
company-stakeholder conflict: Prediction of company-stakeholder conflict remains a weak 
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point in mine design and planning. This research statistically examines a database of mining 
properties and develops multiple linear regression models to identify the most important 
indicators of mining company-stakeholder conflict. These models find that the following 
conditions are the strongest indicators of future conflict: the conflict history of the mining 
property, the conflict history in the mining region, proximity to artisanal mining, and anticipated 
physical and economic displacement of local people. 
A decision tree model which incorporates company-stakeholder conflict into a mining 
project’s valuation: Mining investment decisions rely on a company’s financial valuation of a 
mining project. The discounted cash flow methodology is the foundation of these valuations. 
This research developed a tool for capturing the financial risk associated with higher likelihoods 
of company-stakeholder conflict by quantifying the risk of forced project abandonment. This 
research presents a decision tree model for calculating the expected cost of company-
stakeholder conflict. The model concludes that even moderate conflict likelihoods can reduce 
the net present value (NPV) of a mining project by hundreds of millions of dollars.  
 Collectively these studies conclude that external stakeholders are undervalued by 
mining’s present decision-making paradigms. This dissertation calls on companies and 
governments to place a greater emphasis on external stakeholders’ perspectives on mining. It 
recommends that companies and governments engage these stakeholders in permitting and mine 
design processes such that these decisions include nuanced understandings of how a mine will 
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CHAPTER 1: MINING COMPANIES, COMMUNITIES, AND CONFLICT 
 
1.1. Mining Company-Stakeholder Conflict 
On a sunny day in 2013, residents of the rural Peruvian region of Cajamarca marched to a 
small lake in the Andes Mountains. They held signs saying “Conga ¡No Va!” (No to Conga!) and 
“Aqua Si, Oro No” (Water Yes, Gold No). If the mining plans went ahead, the lake would be 
drained and covered with a tailings impoundment as part of a new copper and gold mine. Protesters 
viewed the lake as agriculturally and culturally important and they did not want it destroyed. 
Scenes like this one were commonplace in Cajamarca starting two years earlier. Protests began in 
earnest in 2011 after talks between local community members and the company had broken down. 
Mining opposition protestors blocked major roads with boulders, dozens of people were injured, 
schools and hospitals in Cajamarca were forced to close, and the Peruvian President declared a 
state of emergency (Els, 2011). The roads, schools and hospitals soon reopened; but the Minas 
Conga project never recovered. In 2015, mid-way through a $5 billion construction investment to 
open the mine (Jamasmie, 2016), Newmont Mining Corporation walked away from the property 
saying that “Under the current social and political environment, the Company does not anticipate 
being able to develop Conga for the foreseeable future.” (Newmont Mining, 2015, p. 22). 
Cases like Minas Conga are increasingly common in the worlds mining districts. 
Stakeholders strongly resist mining at properties such as Pebble in Alaska (Holley & Mitcham, 
2016), Far South East/Lepanto in the Philippines (Stark, et al., 2006), Obuasi in Ghana (Okoh, 
2014), and countless others. Some, like Minas Conga, stall indefinitely. Many lower-profile cases 
never result in outright project suspension, but still strain company-stakeholder relationships and 
alter the course of mining activities and investments. The effect of these cases is an elevated 
attention to the importance of external stakeholders in the success or failure of mining ventures. 
Mining companies and industry consultancies like Rio Tinto, Environmental Resources 
Management, and SRK Consulting increasingly report that “above ground” risks now vastly 
outweigh “technical” risks to mining projects (Rio Tinto, 2011; Upton, 2016; Environmental 




Over the past two decades, scholars have found that stakeholders resist mining projects for 
a variety of specific social and environmental reasons. This body of work encompasses a wide 
range of mining commodities, geographic locations, and conflict scenarios. Conde (2017) provides 
a literature review which concludes that local communities resist mining when there are perceived 
environmental impacts they deem as unacceptable or they lack sufficient representation in the 
mining decision making processes. 
Mining company-stakeholder conflicts typically manifest around competition for access to 
land and environmental resources. Stakeholders resist mining due to actual and anticipated impacts 
on forests (Akpalu & Parks, 2007; Temper & Martinez-Alier, 2013), water (Adler, et al., 2007; Li, 
2015), alpine glaciers (Urkidi, 2010), and fisheries (Holley & Mitcham, 2016). These resources 
are frequently connected to local communities traditional livelihoods including agriculture 
(Haarstad & Floysand, 2007; Avci & Fernandez-Salvador, 2016), and subsistence hunting and 
fishing (Coumans, 2011).  Sometimes stakeholders do not oppose mining per se, rather who should 
be allowed to mine. Artisanal miners often predate the arrival of large-scale companies and oppose 
large scale mining when they are threatened with displacement (Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; 
Carstens & Hilson, 2009; Teschner, 2013). Conflict over environmental resources can include 
disputes over which institutions should control access to land -- highlighting conflicts between 
state and traditional land tenure systems (Banerjee, 2000; Martin, et al., 2016).  
Weak government institutions can exacerbate company-stakeholder conflicts when these 
institutions fail to help companies and stakeholders manage the processes of change (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011; Jaskoski, 2014). This problem is particularly salient when stakeholders do not 
trust their government’s mechanisms of securing consent from local communities (Martin, et al., 
2016). Distrust can stem from previous instances of government-sanctioned violence against 
stakeholders who opposed mining (Teschner, 2013; Martin, et al., 2016) or general insecurity due 
to armed conflicts in the mining region (Holden & Jacobson, 2007). Alternatively, effective 
government institutions can help companies and stakeholder avoid conflict when these institutions 
involve local stakeholders in mining decision-making and are transparent about their dealings with 
companies (Costanza, 2016). 
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1.2. Defining the Stakeholder 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) defines a stakeholder as “persons or groups 
who are directly or indirectly affected by a project, as well as those who may have interests in a 
project and/or the ability to influence its outcome” (International Finance Corporation, 2014, p. 
10). For a mining project, this definition includes people and organizations within the company 
(e.g. company employees, investors, sub-contractors, etc.) and those outside the company (e.g. 
local residents, politicians, government regulators, labor unions, non-governmental organizations 
[NGOs], customers, and suppliers). In the context of mining and its relationships to broader 
society, authors commonly use the term stakeholder to refer specifically to external stakeholders. 
Interwoven into this nomenclature is the term “community,” which often refers to people and 
institutions in the proximity of a mining property; however, the term can also include external 
stakeholders from further afield who have linkages to the mining property such as NGOs, 
traditional owners of land, and religious organizations (Evans & Kemp, 2011). 
This dissertation uses the term stakeholder to refer to external stakeholders specifically. 
The intention in employing this term rather than others (such as “community”) is to suggest an 
expansive definition of the people and organizations that are impacted and affect mining project 
outcomes from outside the company’s walls. Used in this dissertation, the term is meant to capture 
local and non-local people, local and national politicians, local and international NGOs, and other 
similar people and groups. 
1.3 The Rise of International Standards 
The relationship between mining companies and stakeholders garnered mainstream 
attention from the mining industry, governments, and policymakers beginning in the early 2000s. 
One of the most important institutions to come out of this early period is the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM). According to the ICMM website, the council was founded in 2001 
to respond to an industry that was experiencing “growing community unrest, criticism from civil 
society and broader public opposition.”1 In 2002, the founding member companies of the ICMM 





Ashanti, BHP, Freeport McMoRan, Newmont Mining, and Rio Tinto. The companies endorsed 
the findings of the “Breaking New Ground” report by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (2002). This document detailed how the mining industry had failed to meet the 
expectations of global society and called for fundamental changes to the way the industry manages 
its environmental impacts and relationships with stakeholders. The newly formed ICMM distilled 
these findings into its ten guiding principles. Of these ten principles, four explicitly relate to 
company-stakeholder relationships: 
• Principle 3: Uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values in 
dealings with employees and others who are affected by our activities. 
• Principle 6: Seek continual improvement of our environmental performance. 
• Principle 9: Contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of the 
communities in which we operate.  
• Principle 10: Implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and 
independently verified reporting arrangements with our stakeholders (International 
Council on Mining and Metals, 2003). 
Since its inception, the ICMM has played an important role in the evolution of the mining 
industry’s increased focus on its societal impacts. The organization now includes 27 of the world’s 
largest mining companies and 36 industry associations from around the world. The ICMM has 
published countless reports and guidance documents aimed at helping companies improve their 
environmental and social performance. In 2020, the ICMM released an updated set of principles 
aimed at aligning the mining industry’s standards with international development targets such as 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015) and the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change (United Nations, 2016). 
Shortly after the ICMM released its seminal principles, the IFC published its 
Environmental and Social Performance Standards (International Finance Corporation, 2006). 
These standards defined requirements for companies to manage labor relations, the wellbeing of 
local communities, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural heritage. The IFC 
has built upon the Performance Standards with numerous guidance documents for companies and 
investors, including specific handbooks on engaging with stakeholders in developing countries 
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(International Finance Corporation, 2007) and its recommended stakeholder engagement practices 
for junior-sized firms (International Finance Corporation, 2014). In 2012, the IFC updated these 
standards and integrated them into their broader Sustainable Development Framework 
(International Finance Corporation, 2012).  
According to the IFC, the goals of these standards are to: 1. To improve the IFC’s own 
decision making and lending practices, 2. To help companies manage their environmental and 
social impacts, and 3. To improve the development outcomes of on-the-ground investments such 
as mining projects  (International Finance Corporation, 2012, p. 3). Company-led environmental 
and social due diligence assessments form the foundations for these standards. Such assessments 
inform the design of a company’s Environmental and Social Management System from which the 
IFC audits their clients social and environmental performance. Although the IFC only enforces the 
Performance Standards for its client companies, these standards have become the de facto best 
practices for the mining industry, particularly those companies conducting business in developing 
countries. Furthermore, the IFC Performance Standards inspired the creation of the Equator 
Principles, a set of standards interwoven with the IFC Performance Standards and other 
international development goals which has been widely adopted by private financial firms that 
provide financing to mining companies (Equator Principles, 2020). 
Though widely accepted, the implementation of the IFC Performance Standards and 
Equator Principles has received mixed reviews. Wright (2012) for example, notes that the 
Performance Standards and the Equator Principles have elevated the role of environmental and 
social impacts in financial decision-making. But he also found that they are employed unevenly 
across the financial industry and that a lack of transparency has failed to curtail lending to projects 
and companies with poor environmental and social impacts. Industry watchdog organizations 
including Oxfam and the Center for International Environmental Law have submitted reports to 
the United Nations arguing that the Performance Standards and Equator Principles lack adequate 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that companies uphold international standards of human rights 
(Herz, et al., 2008). 
1.4 Social License to Operate (SLO)  
At the center of the corporate adoption of environmental and social standards is the need 
for a company to maintain a “social license to operate” (SLO). Thomson and Boutilier (2011) 
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define the SLO as “a community’s perceptions of the acceptability of a company and its local 
operations”. The term first appeared in the late 1990s originally employed by executives in the 
paper industry to highlight the need for voluntary standards as an effort to stave off additional 
government regulation (Kirsch, 2014, p. 209). Soon after, Placer Dome executive, Jim Cooney, 
applied the term to the mining industry (Prno, 2013). Cooney and others observed that stakeholders 
were increasingly aligning with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
learning about other communities’ experiences with mining through these networks. At that time, 
Cooney perceived an increase in local stakeholders seeking extralegal assurance from mining 
companies that their communities would receive “the same deal” as stakeholders in other parts of 
the world (Cooney, 2017).  
The minerals industry has had a long history of dubious business practices and associated 
public opposition. In 1906, public concerns about land fraud and coal price gouging by mining 
companies prompted the Theodore Roosevelt administration to restrict companies’ access to 
federal land in the United States (U.S.) and briefly establish federally regulated coal prices. By the 
1960s, Americans added environmental damage to their concerns about mining (Switzer, 1997). 
Montrie (2003), chronicled industrial sabotage of Appalachian coal mines in the 1960s where 
protestors destroyed equipment and set fire to mining company buildings. These protesters saw 
mining companies as destroying agricultural lands while simultaneously failing to pay adequate 
wages to local workers. Growing recognition of industry’s impact on the environment gave rise to 
the U.S. environmental legislation of the 1970s including the establishment of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean 
Air Act. These laws inspired similar legislation around the globe (Mandelker, 2010). 
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s the effects of economic globalization changed the 
dynamic between the mining industry and the public. While the globalization paradigm is 
commonly associated with the growth of transnational power of corporations, Haarstad and 
Floysand (2007) argued that this period also saw a “restructuring of social, political, and economic 
processes” that connected mining communities around the world and elevated the influence of 
mining opposition movements. They found that stakeholders at Tambogrande in Peru leaned on 
globalized networks to highlight how their case aligned with global concerns about environmental 
justice. They leveraged support from international organizations and linked the mining project’s 
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negative impacts to issues of national Peruvian identity and neo-colonial domination of the 
Peruvian people. Their movement earned international financial support from non-governmental 
organizations, and eventually lead to the Peruvian government revoking mining permits for the 
project. The Tambogrande deposit remains undeveloped and is credited with inspiring other 
mining opposition movements throughout South America (Haarstad & Floysand, 2007). 
1.5 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Mining companies responded to the pressures on their industry by adopting voluntary 
social and environmental standards under the banner of corporate social responsibility (CSR). As 
originally conceived, CSR was a philanthropic activity rooted in ethics (Friedman, 1970; Caroll, 
1991). But by the late 1990s, the concept of CSR had begun to shift as society increasingly held 
businesses to social standards that went beyond the legal requirements and were now integral to 
profitability. Outside the mining industry, consumers were reporting that a company’s social 
responsibility was a key factor in their purchasing decisions. Consumers boycotted Nike for labor 
practices they saw as exploitative, and Union Oil and PepsiCo for their business ties to Burma, 
where activists believed the military government was violating human rights (Vogel, 2005).   
The entrance of mining companies into the CSR landscape came at a time when CSR was 
evolving from a philanthropic activity to a business strategy. Visser (2011) branded this new line 
of thinking “CSR 2.0” to differentiate it from the philanthropic CSR of Friedman (1970) and 
Carroll (1991). Meanwhile, many in the mining industry abandoned the term “CSR” entirely, 
choosing to brand social activities under the heading of “sustainable development”, “social 
performance”, “social investment”, “environmental and social governance” or similar language 
which they felt linked their social programs more directly to the survival and profitability of their 
company (Dashwood, 2012, pp. 36-72). 
Modern mining firms embrace CSR as part of their business activities. In 2017, Gold 
Fields’ CEO Nick Holland declared that social investment, technological innovation, and 
environmental advancements are critical pieces of his “mine of the future” because he believes 
that societal pressures have increased the time and risk associated with developing mining projects 
(Holland, 2017). Gary Goldberg, CEO of Newmont, highlights environmental, social, and 
economic performance as the three pillars of the company’s future sustainability (Newmont 
Mining, 2015).  
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Despite the corporate popularity of CSR, it is not always clear how and to what extent 
company-led programs improve mining’s impacts on local communities, or even reduce company-
stakeholder conflict. Dashwood (2012) concludes that mining companies’ CSR activities are 
largely driven by evolving industry norms and community pressures rather than project risk 
conditions. Owen and Kemp (2017) question whether CSR programs address the gap between 
community expectations and mining company actions, or simply mask mining’s negative effects 
on local stakeholders. Furthermore, they argue that companies’ CSR programs can be shallow, 
disingenuous, and potentially damaging because CSR conflates corporate self-interest with a 
desire for local stakeholder benefits. 
1.6 Balancing Risks and Benefits  
Few tools exist to help companies balance stakeholder priorities with the financial priorities 
of the business. For this reason, CSR programs sometimes seem decoupled from the problems they 
aim to address. This fact is exemplified by the investment strategies that companies use for the 
CSR programs they deploy. Companies sometimes apply seemingly arbitrary formulas to 
determine the funding and activities within their programs. For example, Gold Fields’ mines in 
Ghana invest $1 per ounce of produced gold plus 0.5% of pre-tax profits to CSR programs (Gold 
Fields, Ltd, 2011), and Freeport McMoRan’s Indonesian operations allocate 1% of revenue to 
community investment (Freeport McMoRan, 2017). These programs result in many millions of 
dollars for CSR, and a structured commitment to social programs. But, it is hard not to notice that 
these formulas are tied to mine production, rather than the concerns of stakeholders. In Ghana, for 
example, the formula used by Gold Fields directed more investment towards social programs at 
the Tarkwa mine than at the Damang mine, despite the fact that Damang had a recent history of 
conflict and Tarkwa did not (Teschner, 2013). 
To address this challenge, several researchers have attempted to quantify company-
stakeholder conflict risk. Davis and Franks (2014) determined that social conflicts can cost a large 
mine $20 million per week, but they were unable to provide more granular guidance about how 
site- or conflict-specific conditions might affect this number. The IFC’s Financial Valuation Tool 
(commonly called the FV Tool) attempts to use site-specific criteria, but the tool relies on a 
subjective quantification of both risks and the potential effects of mitigation activities 
(International Finance Corporation, 2017). For example, the tool asks the user to input an 
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individual risk such a ‘lawsuit’ and quantify the potential costs of this risk, and the company’s 
perception of their ability to control the outcome. Mining executives who were consulted for the 
present research said that they were more comfortable with Davis and Franks’ simplified number 
than the FV Tool. They suggested that the FV Tool was an attempt “to do too much” and 
complained that it required “an army of consultants” to make it function.  
The quantification of the risk of company-stakeholder conflict remains a weak point in the 
mine planning and development process. At its most benign, this problem results in companies 
investing in social programs when they need not do so. More commonly though, companies under-
invest in their relationships with stakeholders, invest in programs and the activities that do not 
align with stakeholders’ concerns, or invest too late, leading to social conflict that might have been 
avoided. In some cases, companies enter into projects unaware that the company-stakeholder 
conflict risks are extremely high, and become embroiled in a conflict over a property that was 
unlikely to ever result in a successful mine. 
1.7 The Perspective of this Dissertation 
This dissertation primarily considers company-stakeholder relationships from the 
perspective of mining companies and government regulators. The reason for this choice is the 
belief that companies and governments currently lack appropriate tools for incorporating 
stakeholder perspectives into their decision-making processes.  
This dissertation views company-stakeholder relationships from the neoliberal perspective. 
In this framing, the SLO and the CSR programs are tools of corporate self-interest. As critics of 
the industry posit, “What business case value would [SLO] offer if communities were unable to 
negatively impact on the operation?” (Owen & Kemp, 2015, p. 35). Without the rise of significant 
opposition, mining companies would not focus on social and environmental impacts. From the 
perspective of this dissertation, mining companies employ the term SLO and deploy CSR 
programs per the advice of Friedman (1970) who argued that the “social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits” and advocated for social investment spending only when it was in the 
direct self-interest of the business. This view suggests that corporations are amoral when it comes 
to their relationships to society (Bone, 2012).  
10 
 
If we accept Friedman’s view that companies are beholden only to their shareholders, then 
it is imperative that companies have tools to understand how socially unacceptable corporate 
behavior translates into cost and business risks. This dissertation’s author views the rise of the 
SLO paradigm generally, and CSR programs specifically, as important for two primary reasons: 
First, globalization of telecommunications and the internet have increased the visibility of mining 
corporations’ negative impacts on local people. Societies are using the tools of globalization to 
demand that companies comply with international norms and align with local expectations of 
ethical business behavior. From the perspective of the author, these pressures move the mining 
industry in a net positive moral direction. Second, the power of stakeholder support or opposition 
to mining projects in the globalized context now transcends power structures that have previously 
limited local stakeholders’ voices in mining project decision making. 
1.8 Purpose of This Research 
Mining’s external stakeholders are likely to view the risks and benefits of mining quite 
differently than the mining company These divergent views create a disconnect among project 
risks, company CSR programs, and the future viability of a mining venture. This condition stems 
in part, from an inability to quantify the effect that company-stakeholder relationships and 
stakeholders’ relationships to the environment are likely to have on a mining investment. This 
dissertation is a compilation of three research papers that explores this topic. These papers seek to 
answer three research questions through the following research activities:  
• How can governments better integrate local communities’ perceptions and concerns 
into mine permitting decisions? Chapter 2 examines the implementation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) at the Donlin Gold project in Western Alaska. NEPA 
serves as the baseline for the permitting decisions of federal and many state agencies. The 
law requires multiple rounds of public consultation and extensive disclosure of a project’s 
environmental impacts for the purposes of both agency decision making and public 
awareness. The NEPA process at Donlin employed some unique elements of stakeholder 
involvement in the process such as including Alaskan Native tribes as cooperating 
agencies. This chapter discusses the successes and failures of Donlin’s NEPA process with 
respect to bringing stakeholder concerns into the decision-making process, and the barriers 
in the law to building trust among local stakeholders, the mining company, and regulators. 
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• What are the most important indicators of company-stakeholder conflict? Chapter 3 
presents a statistical examination of social and environmental variables’ relationships to 
company-stakeholder conflict. This chapter employs a database of 23 mining properties to 
identify the features that are the best indicators of future company-stakeholder conflict. 
The chapter discusses these indicators and how these findings may affect the decisions of 
companies, investors, policy makers, and governments. 
• How does stakeholder opposition affect the valuation of a mining property? Chapter 
4 suggests a framework for translating company-stakeholder conflict risk into financial risk 
to mining companies. This model overlays the average frequency of a company-
stakeholder conflict onto the project’s discounted cash flow model. The method uses a 
decision-tree analysis to determine the effects of company-stakeholder conflict risk on the 
net present value (NPV) of the property. This study finds that even moderate levels of 





CHAPTER 2: PARTICIPATION OR FRUSTRATION? LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS AND THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA): DONLIN GOLD PROJECT, WESTERN 
ALASKA 
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter examines the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) at the Donlin Gold project in Western Alaska. Regulators interviewed for this study 
reported that the Donlin Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was detailed and thorough, 
especially compared to other EIS studies with which those regulators had been involved. 
Additionally, Donlin’s EIS involved local tribal governments as cooperating agencies, a 
stakeholder engagement approach that was unique and potentially innovative. Yet, many 
stakeholders felt that these efforts were insufficient. Nearly all local stakeholders interviewed for 
this study expressed frustration with the NEPA process and the regulators who implemented it. 
They reported that they felt patronized by a bureaucratic process that focused on fitting stakeholder 
concerns into technical and scientific disciplines for analysis by outside experts. Many local 
stakeholders reported feeling unrepresented in the EIS and that stakeholders’ local knowledge was 
undervalued by regulators during the process.  
Despite their nearly universal frustrations with the EIS process, interviewed stakeholders 
expressed differing perspectives on the whether the Donlin deposit should be developed into a 
mine. At the time of this research, public opinion on Donlin was divided. Some stakeholders 
expressed support for the mine expressing a view that it could be source of economic stability that 
would enhance the continuation of local traditions and lifestyles. Some of these stakeholders cited 
their trust of Donlin Gold, LLC., the project’s proponent, which has had a presence in the region 
for decades. Many other local stakeholders strongly opposed the mine. They viewed the mine and 
the company as a potential threat to the environmental resources that are fundamental to local 
traditions and lifestyles. These stakeholders were skeptical of the company expressing the belief 
that company employees minimized the proposed mine’s environmental risks and that the 




This study adds to the literature on the power imbalances and politicization of information 
that underpins technocratic approaches to impact assessment. It concludes that simply augmenting 
the quantity of scientific study is unlikely to achieve NEPA’s goal of stakeholder involvement in 
the impact assessment process. Rather, regulatory personnel must focus on building trust between 
their agencies and local communities through 1) collaborative implementation of NEPA that 
elevates the importance of local knowledge in agency disclosure and permitting actions and 2) 
transparent dialogue with local stakeholders early in the process about NEPA’s limitations with 
respect to turning stakeholders’ concerns into enforceable project requirements. 
2.2 Introduction 
This paper examines the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) at the Donlin Gold project in Western Alaska. In July 2018, the Army Corps of Engineers 
published a 10,000 page Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Donlin. The EIS 
disclosed the proposed mines potential impacts to the natural environment, local socio-economic 
systems, and human health.  In August 2018, the Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and the 
Bureau of Land Management published a Record of Decision (ROD) recommending that the 
project receive a Section 404 Clean Water Act Permit, and a Section 10 Rivers and Harbors Act 
Permit from the Army Corps; and approval for rights of way and other lesser permits from the 
Bureau of Land Management. The Final EIS and ROD represented the culmination of a seven-
year long process of public comment, scientific study, and project impact disclosure.  
The communities of the Middle Kuskokwim region, the most proximate to the mine, have 
had a decades-long relationship with Donlin Gold, LLC, the project’s proponent. The company’s 
corporate social responsibility programs, hiring practices, and personal contact with community 
leaders have focused heavily on this region. Stakeholders from these communities were more 
likely to express support for developing the project. They reported a relatively high level of trust 
in the company and a belief that the mines economic benefits would outweigh the risks. 
Stakeholders further downriver in the Lower Kuskokwim region were more likely to oppose the 
mine. They commonly reported that they thought the environmental costs of the mine were being 
minimized, that their concerns were not adequately incorporated into the EIS process, and that any 
benefits that come from the mine would not outweigh the costs to their ways of life. 
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Underpinning the local debate about Donlin are stakeholder concerns about the NEPA 
process itself: What level of understanding is sufficient to meet NEPA’s requirements of 
environmental disclosure “to the fullest extent possible” (National Environmental Policy Act, 
1969)? Which impacts are important enough to warrant additional study, mitigating measures, or 
a decision to mine development entirely? How are a mine’s predicted negative impacts weighed 
against its potential benefits? And perhaps most critically, who gets to decide? The EIS process at 
Donlin sought to incorporate local stakeholders’ views in a unique and innovative way. Tribal 
governments worked as cooperating agencies in the process alongside the Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Bureau of Land Management, and others. The quantity of environmental, social, 
and public health information that regulators gathered on Donlin resulted in a Final EIS document 
that was over 10,000 pages. And yet, stakeholders expressed distrust and strong frustration with 
the EIS process and the regulators who implemented it regardless of whether those stakeholders 
supported or opposed the development of the mine.  
Stakeholders criticized the EIS’s public comment process, saying it was insufficient and 
that agencies did not listen to them. They complained that communities’ local knowledge of the 
environment was marginalized in favor of fractionalizing complex concerns into technical and 
scientific categories that could be analyzed by outside experts. Through their cooperating agency 
roles, tribal governments pushed for the EIS to examine impacts to species and subjects that had 
little previous documentation in western science. Their efforts resulted in EIS chapters specifically 
relevant to their concerns. Yet, these tribal governments found themselves frustrated when the EIS 
predicted negative impacts but required no mitigating actions of their causes. 
The Army Corps for their part, reported a tension in the Donlin NEPA process between the 
wide breadth of environmental impact disclosures that many stakeholders expected, and the limited 
permitting authorities of the federal agencies. Indeed, NEPA is both a disclosure law and is meant 
to inform subsequent federal actions. In the case of Donlin, the Army Corps noted that many of 
the impacts that the Donlin EIS disclosed, including some of those championed by cooperating 
agency tribes, did not full under federal permitting authority. These impacts were left unresolved 
by the process. 
This paper asks what we might learn from the Donlin EIS story? What should local 
stakeholders expect of NEPA? How can the EIS process improve to meet the needs of an American 
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population that is increasingly concerned about mining’s environmental impacts? And how should 
the agencies charged with implementing NEPA seek to engage with a growing number of 
stakeholders who want their voices heard in resource development decision-making processes?  
2.2.1 Environmental Impact Statements and NEPA 
The U.S. National Environmental Policy Act was passed in 1969 and signed into law in 
1970 (National Environmental Policy Act, 1969). It represented the first major piece of legislation 
to come out of the American environmental movement of the 1960s and ‘70s. The law requires 
that the federal government consider environmental consequences alongside the economic and 
technical benefits of proposed projects and seek public input in the decision-making process. 
NEPA has been called the “Magna Carta of environmental law” (Mandelker, 2010, p. 293) and 
was used as a model for environmental regulations in many other countries (Morgan, 2012). In 
seven pages, the law outlines a grand view of the role that environmental considerations should 
play in federal decision-making, saying that the aim is:  
…to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, 
in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the 
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans. 
(National Environmental Policy Act, 1969, p. Section 101) 
The law tasks each generation as an environmental trustee for the next; calling for 
prioritization of an environment which supports diversity, protects national heritage, and reduces 
risks to health and safety, and aiming for the maximum attainable reuse of non-renewable 
resources.  
Perhaps more importantly, NEPA mandates that government agencies employ 
interdisciplinary approaches to quantifying potential environmental impacts, evaluate possible 
alternatives, and document these findings in a public statement (National Environmental Policy 
Act). Unlike most environmental regulations in the U.S., NEPA requires agencies to 
comprehensively disclose project impacts, but it does not require any specific environmental 
actions or set any environmental standards. A court decision in 1989 solidified the view that NEPA 
does not “mandate particular results” and instead that the law “prescribes the process for 
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preventing uninformed – rather than unwise – agency action” (Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens, 1989). Environmental advocates point to this case as one that both strengthened the 
extensiveness of NEPA’s reach and limited its effectiveness at elevating environmental concerns 
(Sowards, 2019). 
The teeth of the law reside in the threat of legal scrutiny against agencies that produce 
impact statements that are incomplete or that falsely minimize the environmental risks (Dreyfus & 
Ingram, 1976). Legal challenges have indeed been critical to codifying NEPA’s mandate. From 
1974 to 2004 there were an average of 95 NEPA cases per year decided in the courts (Austin, et 
al., 2004). Since its inception, the law has evolved to fundamentally change the way U.S. federal 
agencies manage environmental considerations. Because of the breadth and depth of scientific 
study required by the modern permutation of NEPA, the resulting documents have become the de 
facto basis for subsequent permitting actions by states and the federal government.  
NEPA provides an expansive vision for the limits of its mandate, calling for agencies to 
consider environmental concerns “to the fullest extent possible,” and provides language interpreted 
by courts to mean that agencies must adhere to the NEPA statues unless they are specifically 
prohibited from doing so under other laws. When the law went into effect, early NEPA scholars 
considered how far these limits would stretch. Hanks and Hanks (1970) posited:  
Must [the agencies] bring all of their activities into conformity with the policies of 
the Act? For example, is the Act applicable to the [Atomic Energy Commission] 
when it licenses nuclear power plants? The [Army] Corps of Engineers when an 
application seeks a fill or construction permit? The Secretary of [Housing and 
Urban Development] when he approves the redevelopment plan of a local 
redevelopment agency? The [Federal Housing Administration] when it insures 
home mortgages in a subdivision development? The [Interstate Commerce 
Commission] when it has been asked to approve the discontinuation of commuter 
train service? In every one of these cases a potentially detrimental environmental 
impact exists. In every one there is a causal connection between the government 
action and the environmental impact. 
Indeed, most of these examples are now considered under NEPA’s purview. Moreover, the 
level of detail required to comply with the law became ever more rigorous and specific over time. 
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Dreyfus and Ingram (1976) note that some early EIS documents were excessively short (only three 
pages in length in some cases) leading to litigation from environmental activist groups. These legal 
challenges and subsequent court decisions upholding the law’s mandate of public disclosure have 
resulted in increasingly lengthy permitting timelines and correspondingly large EIS documents. 
The Council on Environmental Quality reported that the mean Final EIS compiled between 2013 
and 2017 was 669 pages with approximately 3% of Final EIS documents exceeding 2000 pages 
(Council on Environmental Quality, 2019). 
In the decades since its passage, legal challenges and Council on Environmental Quality 
directives have transformed NEPA into the bureaucratic process shown in Figure 2.1. In recent 
decades, major mining projects almost universally require a full EIS, and the Donlin project is no 
exception. Although the U.S. government does not keep comprehensive data on the costs of NEPA 
analyses, the Department of Energy (DOE) reported that their average cost of producing an EIS 
between 2003-2012 was $6.6 million (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014). In the case 
of large private sector projects such as Donlin, large portions of these costs are borne by the 
company. 
In the case of private-sector projects such as the development of a mine there is a tension 
in NEPA between its environmental disclosure mandate, and the scope of the federal decisions it 
is aiming to inform. In the mining context, federal agencies regulatory power is typically limited 
to the issuance of permits. This goal promotes a technocratic approach to impact examination 
rooted in determining whether or not the agency should issue specific environmental permits with 
specific issuance criteria. Yet, NEPA’s mandate requires that regulators examine and disclose 
concerns from non-permitting federal agencies, state agencies, and the public – leaving the 
potential for NEPA to identify some environmental concerns, but not provide resolutions 





Figure 2.1: Flow chart of the NEPA process. Taken from the US Government Accountability 
Office (2014). 
The influence of NEPA and other similar impact assessment processes around the world 
has led to the global rise of a technocratic approach to environmental policy-making (Yap, 1990; 
United Nations Environmental Program, 2004). This paradigm purports to elevate “evidence-
based policy” above political beliefs (Cashmore, et al., 2010). Yet, many scholars point out that 
these processes themselves constitute political advocacy because they seek to impose a set of 
norms around which impacts should be considered and which methods are deemed acceptable for 
assessing these impacts. Promotors of the rationalist (i.e. scientific) assessment methodologies 
assume that scientific and planning experts are neutral to project outcomes and therefore serve as 
independent evaluators (Morgan, 2012). Critics argue that this assumption is not only false 
(Cashmore, et al., 2010), but also creates power imbalances between those that have access to 
highly-educated technical experts (i.e. government and corporations) and those who do not (i.e. 
local communities and marginalized groups) (Lane & Corbett, 2005). Critics also argue that 
elevating scientific expertise minimizes the contributions of local and indigenous environmental 
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knowledge (Hanna, et al., 2014). In the context of projects involving Native Americans and 
Alaskan Natives specifically, Dongoske et al argue that (2015) NEPA promotes a western 
worldview that marginalizes native peoples and perpetuates colonialist attitudes. Many Native 
American people view the US government as complicit in private companies’ exploitation of tribal 
lands and people, often bolstered by permitting laws they view as inadequate (Allison III, 2015). 
Lawrence (2013) notes that stakeholders will only remain involved in the impact 
assessment process if they see it as legitimate and a reasonable path to their desired outcomes. 
Stakeholders that feel marginalized are likely to disconnect from a process like NEPA and employ 
alternative techniques to achieve their objectives instead – such as direct opposition to the project’s 
proponent. Modern NEPA primarily seeks to achieve the goal of legitimate public involvement 
through a process of public consultation. The intent of NEPA’s public consultations are to provide 
a mechanism for non-agency stakeholders to raise concerns and prompt agencies to examine 
unique local conditions. The law’s custodians have aspired to allow the public a “relatively high 
level of influence in our decision making” (U.S. Council on Enviromental Quality, 2007, p. 3), 
advocating that such collaboration can result in a fairer process, prevent conflict, make project 
implementation easier, and (most relevant to the present study) promote greater trust by 
“increasing public confidence in the government” (p. 5). Despite these efforts, critics of 
environmental impact assessments still argue that stakeholders are marginalized by the processes’ 
technical emphasis.  
Industry critics of NEPA point out that the law is excessively cumbersome. They argue 
that the process has been used as a tool by activists to obstruct agency decision-making through 
the law’s primary enforcement mechanism, litigation (and in the case of mining, delay 
implementation of the mine) (Mandelker, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the mining industry is quick to 
highlight the money and time that NEPA costs companies. A report compiled for the National 
Mining Association claims that permitting a new mine in the U.S. takes 7-10 years, compared to 
approximately 2 years in Canada and Australia. The association blames the extended timeline on 
NEPA in general, and specifically on the inefficiencies associated with government agencies 




The present study recognizes the systemic shortcomings of NEPA. Indeed, some 
interviewees for this study (both project proponents and opponents) expressed the view that NEPA 
is fundamentally flawed and should be dramatically changed or entirely replaced. Respecting these 
views, this paper assumes that NEPA will remain at the foundation of federal environmental 
decision making for the foreseeable future and that improvements to the law will happen 
incrementally. The case study presented here adds to the body of work calling for improvement in 
how regulators manage stakeholder participation in the NEPA process, reaching the important 
conclusion that increasing the quantity of public comment and/or scientific study is insufficient to 
address many stakeholders’ concerns around how the law treats them and the information they 
contribute. This paper considers how other elements of NEPA, namely its almost exclusive 
reliance on expert-led scientific studies, may be limiting the law’s potential for broader stakeholder 
involvement. This work affirms the calls of the Council on Environmental Quality and scholars 
that there are opportunities for improving stakeholder trust and its environmental impact 
conclusions by improving NEPA’s implementation.   
2.2.2 The Donlin Gold Project 
The Donlin Gold project is a proposed open pit mine that would produce one million 
ounces of gold per year over a mine life of 27 years. At the time of this research, the project was 
in the advanced permitting stage. If built, it would be one of the largest gold mines in the world. 
The project is located 280 miles west of Anchorage in an area known as the Yukon-Kuskokwim 
Delta region. The deposit is 10 miles north of the small village of Crooked Creek (See Figure 2.2). 
The mine site would consist of a 2.2 mile long by 1.0 mile wide open pit, a mill with a capacity of 
59,000 tons per day, a 2,350 acre waste treatment facility, a 2,240 acre waste rock facility, and a 
natural gas-fired 227 megawatt power plant (See Figure 2.3). The mine would have a 5,000 foot-
long airstrip and a 30 mile-long road connecting the mine site to a barge landing on the Kuskokwim 
River. Most of the project’s materials, fuel, and equipment would be transported to the site on river 
barges during the open-water season, typically May to October. To supply the power plant, the 
company would build a 300 mile-long natural gas pipeline from the mine site to the Cook Inlet 




Figure 2.2: Map of the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta region showing the location of the Donlin deposit 
and select villages in the region. The dashed area indicates the Middle Kuskokwim region. See 
Figure 2.4 for a detailed map of that area. 
The Donlin project is owned by the Donlin Gold company. The company has its corporate 
offices in Anchorage and two small community relations offices in the Kuskokwim region located 
in the villages of Bethel and Aniak. The Donlin project is Donlin Gold’s only asset. At the time of 
this dissertation, Donlin Gold was 50% owned by Vancouver-based junior mining firm NovaGold 
Resources, which reported Donlin as its only source of mineral resources and reserves (NovaGold 
Resources, 2018). The other 50% of Donlin Gold was owned by the Toronto-based mining giant 
Barrick Gold Corporation, which reported producing over 4.5 million ounces of gold and 382 
million pounds of copper from 19 mines around the world in 2018. In addition to these operating 
mines, they report five properties (including Donlin) in their project development pipeline (Barrick 
Gold Corporation, 2018). 
The mineral rights on the Donlin property are owned by the Calista Corporation, and the 
surface rights are owned by The Kuskokwim Corporation. Both organizations are categorized as 
Alaskan Native Corporations, which were created by the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act 
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(ANCSA) of 1971 and are entirely owned by Alaskan Native shareholders. In addition to the 
Donlin property, the Calista Corporation holds the mineral rights and some surface rights on behalf 
of 56 villages in the lower Yukon River, the Middle and Lower Kuskokwim River regions, 
Nunivak Island, and the Bering Sea coast along the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta2. The Kuskokwim 
Corporation holds approximately one million acres of surface rights on behalf of the ten villages 
in the Middle Kuskokwim region3. 
The period since the passage of ANCSA accelerated changes in Alaskan Native 
communities that were already in motion. Since the late 1800s, the people of the Kuskokwim had 
been adapting their cultural practices in response to western missionaries, traders, and early 
explorers looking for gold, furs, and shipping passages. These influences gradually pushed Yup’ik 
people away from their traditional lifestyles, lessened their dependence on subsistence hunting and 
fishing, and increasingly introduced money and wage-labor into the economic system in the region 
(Oswalt, 1990). Native Corporations are implicated in continuing this trend of globalization, 
bringing services like western healthcare, internet access, and electricity to their shareholder 
communities, but also diluting traditional culture (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
Many people do not view the Native Corporations favorably. Some scholars have argued that the 
need for financial solvency requires the corporations to sacrifice cultural preservation in favor of 
resource development (Anders & Anders, 1986). Indeed, some interviewees for the present study 
expressed this view as well, noting that the goals of the Calista Corporation and those of tribal 







Figure 2.3: Map of proposed Donlin Mine infrastructure. Adapted from Army Corps of 
Engineers (2018). 
The Kuskokwim region is sparsely populated by rural Alaskan communities. The Bethel 
Census Area, which is a 45,500 square mile area comprising the Lower and Middle Kuskokwim 
region, has a population of approximately 18,000 people, nearly 7,000 of whom live in the area’s 
largest town, Bethel. Alaskan Natives, primarily from the Yup’ik language group, make up about 
84% of the region’s population with white and other non-native peoples comprising the remainder 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). The ten villages that comprise the Middle Kuskokwim region are the 
closest to the Donlin Project and would likely feel the greatest impact from mining activities should 
the mining project go forward. The villages of the Middle Kuskokwim are extremely remote, 
accessible only by light aircraft via small, dirt airstrips; or by snowmobile during winter; or by 
boat during the summer. The most recent US census found that the total population of these ten 
villages was 1,379 and that two of the villages (Napaimute and Georgetown) were only seasonally 




Figure 2.4: Middle Kuskokwim region showing the Donlin project location and stakeholder 
villages. Map adapted from The Kuskokwim Corporation4. Population data from 2010 US Census. 
2.2.3 Methods 
This research was conducted between November 2017 and February 2020. The work 
included 30 semi-structured interviews with 30 stakeholders. Twenty-six (27) of the interviews 
were conducted one-on-one. Three (3) interviews were conducted with small groups (two or three 
interviewees) arranged according to the interviewees’ preference. The lead author conducted a ten-
day field visit to the Lower and Middle Kuskokwim regions, and Anchorage in early April 2018. 
During this visit, the author collected most of the in-person interviews. Some pre-trip interviews, 
and post-trip follow-up interviews were conducted over the phone. Interviewees were initially 
identified through contacts at Donlin Gold, the Center for Science and Public Participation (CSP2), 
and by reaching out to authors of relevant local newspaper editorials. Additional interviewees were 
identified through snowball sampling, where interviewees are asked to identify other potential 
candidates. In addition to formal interviews, the lead author had numerous casual conversations 
about Donlin with local stakeholders in the Kuskokwim region. 
The population of the Middle and Lower Kuskokwim region is quite small, so many people 





sometimes current or former company employees, had worked with regulators or contractors on a 
study related to the project’s EIS, and/or held positions in tribal government or one of the native 
corporations. Likewise, some interviewees had worked on the project with regulatory agencies, 
and then at different times for Donlin Gold or its contractors. Others had previously held positions 
with government agencies where they had worked with NEPA on projects unrelated to Donlin.  
The 30 interviewees can be grouped in to the following categories: eight (8) Donlin Gold 
employees or contractors who are not residents of the Kuskokwim region; three (3) Donlin Gold 
employees or contractors who are residents of the Kuskokwim region; eleven (11) residents of the 
Kuskokwim region who had not worked for the company; three (3) native corporation employees; 
and four (5) employees of federal, state, or local government agencies. Fourteen (47%) of the 
interviewees self-identified as Alaskan Native.  
The Donlin project’s design process and NEPA analysis is well documented in the public 
domain. The, ROD, Final EIS, Draft EIS, Scoping Report, plus records and transcripts of 
stakeholder meetings, design alternatives, and permit applications are publicly available dating 
back to 2012. Coupled with academic literature, these documents provide the basis for both this 
paper’s historical context and the discussion of the mine’s technical design and proposed 
infrastructure. 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
The following sections discuss interviewees’ detailed perspectives and experiences with 
Donlin in three important ways: First, the “2.3.1 Rural Alaska, Livelihoods, and Subsistence” 
section describes rural lifestyles in the Kuskokwim region and how practices like subsistence 
hunting and fishing set the stage for residents’ perspectives on Donlin and many of their 
contributions to the Donlin EIS. Second, the “2.3.2 NEPA at Donlin Gold,” and “2.3.3 Stakeholder 
Comments in the EIS Process” sections show how these perspectives aligned and mis-aligned with 
the findings of the EIS. Third, the “2.3.4 Whom Do Local Stakeholders Trust?” and “2.3.5 Alaska 
Ballot Measure 1” sections discuss how stakeholders’ relationships with Donlin Gold and 
government agency regulators contributed to their support or opposition to the Donlin mine at the 
conclusion of the NEPA process at Donlin.  
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2.3.1 Rural Alaska, Livelihoods, and Subsistence 
Stakeholders’ perceptions on the resiliency of the Kuskokwim region’s local customs and 
the environmental resources that support it form an important backdrop to the story of the Donlin 
project and its EIS. There are two competing paradigms on how the Donlin mine would affect the 
Kuskokwim region. In one perspective, the proposed mine is viewed as a source of economic 
stability that would enhance the continuation of local customs and lifestyle. From the other 
perspective the mine is a potential threat to these traditions, the environmental resources 
fundamental to local ways of life, and could lead to increases in social ills like alcohol and drug 
abuse. Nearly all stakeholders interviewed for this work expressed some recognition of both 
paradigms; but how they weighed these competing narratives largely determined their support or 
opposition to the proposed mine. 
Most people in the Kuskokwim region practice a subsistence or mixed-economic lifestyle 
where fishing, hunting, and gathering of natural berries and plants constitute important traditional 
activities and provide a large percentage of their food supply. Alaskan law recognizes subsistence 
hunting, fishing, and gathering as a customary activity that supports the traditions and economies 
of rural Alaska. This tradition includes a non-monetary trade where Alaskan Natives share harvests 
with families and others far from the harvest source. The practice is regulated by the Alaskan 
Department of Fish and Game, which issues subsistence permits and enforces bag limits. These 
permits are issued to Alaskan residents when the harvests are intended for: 
“…direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or 
transportation, for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products 
of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family consumption, and for the customary 
trade, barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption…” (AS 16.05.940 (33)). 
Among residents of the Kuskokwim region, “subsistence” is used to refer to whatever 
hunting, fishing, or gathering activity is seasonally appropriate in that moment. Kuskokwim region 
residents discussed engaging in subsistence activities as part of their regular routine. These 
activities are closely tied to community values; family cultures; and identities as rural, Alaskan 
Natives. Alaskan Native interviewees expressed a belief that subsistence activities created 
cohesion in their villages. Elders discussed how the work of hunting, fishing, and gathering 
provided a link between the modern generations and their ancestral heritage. They described how 
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subsistence activities created multigenerational linkages; requiring the labor of everyone in the 
family to help catch, process, and store fish and big game during the salmon runs and hunting 
seasons. Children who had left the region for jobs in urban areas often return to their home villages 
to help during the busy subsistence seasons, especially the summer salmon runs.  
Despite its deep historic roots, the activities of modern subsistence are not primitive. 
Rather, they closely resemble their commercial and sporting parallels. Subsistence hunters use 
modern firearms, all-terrain vehicles, and snowmachines5 to pursue moose, musk ox, and caribou. 
Residents fish for salmon with nylon gill nets cast from aluminum skiffs outfitted with outboard 
motors. These tools and the fuel to run them require money and are especially expensive in rural 
Alaskan communities like those in the Kuskokwim region. As one interviewee put it “[Modern 
subsistence is] not the subsistence my grandparents experienced … modern subsistence takes 
money.” 
Rural lifestyles and the subsistence activities that support them are central to the cultural 
identity of the Kuskokwim region. However, elders interviewed for the present study reported a 
declining interest in subsistence among younger people in the villages and increased outmigration 
of young people to urban centers like Anchorage and Fairbanks. A study of new enrollees in the 
Anchorage school system by Lowe (2010) quantitatively supports this observation. Among new 
enrollees from off-road communities6, the greatest number came from the Bethel Census Area 
(around 13%). Lowe’s conclusions align with those of Kuskokwim region interviewees who cite 
better employment opportunities, improved access to education for children, and the high cost of 
living in rural communities as the most common reasons that people moved away from their rural 
villages. Improved education levels and elevated economic class seem to be positive determinates 
of this outmigration. For example, one interviewee who had worked for Donlin in the past said 
that his employment with the company enabled his family to move to Anchorage. Interestingly, he 
also reported that his family remains active in his home village, especially during the summer 
 
5 In Alaskan terminology, a snowmobile is called a “snowmachine” or a “sno-go” 
6 Large portions of Alaska are not connected by any roads to the state’s major cities. 
Unsurprisingly, these jurisdictions have their own unique sets of socio-economic challenges. 
Studies often find it useful to separate the on-road and off-road communities into two distinct 
populations when analyzing socio-economic data. 
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salmon fishing season. This movement exemplifies a strategy of “circular migration” observed by 
Lowe (2010) where families aim to maintain connections to their home communities despite living 
elsewhere.  
Youth outmigration is not the only threat to subsistence. Rural residents worry that even if 
younger people were not leaving, that future environmental conditions may not support the 
subsistence harvests that their communities have relied upon in the past. Interviewees most 
commonly expressed concerns about king (Chinook) salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha). The 
king is the largest species of salmon and temporally the first salmon species to run in the 
Kuskokwim River each season. The kings typically appearing just as residents’ stores from the 
previous year’s harvest have been depleted. Therefore, the king species has represented an 
important proportion of the annual subsistence harvest in recent decades.  
The Kuskokwim king salmon have seen steep population declines since a peak run in 2004. 
Since 2010, king salmon stocks have been well below historical averages; and since 2014, harvests 
have been below Alaska Fish and Game’s estimate of the amounts necessary for subsistence 
(Smith & Liller, 2018). The reasons for these declines are not clear. One study from the nearby 
Yukon River suggests that decreased survival of juvenile fish may play a role (Murphy, et al., 
2017). Fish biologists consulted for the current research believe that the decline of kings in the 
Kuskokwim is likely complex and multivariate. To promote the king salmon’s recovery, Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game placed moratoriums on commercial and sport fishing during the 
king salmon run and imposed extensive restrictions on subsistence fishing during these times as 
well. Since the king run overlaps with that of the chum salmon run (Oncorhynchus keta), the 
restrictions aimed at protecting the kings have also reduced harvests of chum (Tiernan, et al., 
2018).  
Fishing restrictions are credited with recent increases in the number of kings in the 
Kuskokwim River, but stocks remain well below average (Tiernan, et al., 2018). Despite the weak 
numbers, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game remains under pressure from residents to allow 
29 
 
more subsistence harvesting. At a Kuskokwim Salmon Management Working Group7 meeting in 
Bethel, residents from around the Kuskokwim region cried as they explained that some people in 
their communities had nothing to eat. One woman likened the fishing restrictions to “a moratorium 
on grocery stores” and another decried “We are hungry up here!” (Demer, 2017). 
In the context of the Kuskokwim region’s reliance on subsistence activities, the Donlin EIS 
focuses heavily on the proposed mine’s potential impacts on subsistence resources, especially the 
health of salmon populations in the Kuskokwim River and salmon spawning areas in tributaries 
near the Donlin deposit that would be destroyed if the mine goes ahead. 
2.3.2 NEPA at Donlin Gold 
Donlin Gold applied to begin its EIS process in July 2012. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Army Corps) became the lead government agency on the EIS. Cooperating agencies 
included four other federal agencies (Bureau of Land Management, Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service), the State of Alaska, and six tribal governments (Akiak Native Community, Knik 
Tribal Council, Native Village of Napaimute, Native Village of Chuathbaluk, Village of Lower 
Kalskag, and the Village of Crooked Creek)8.  
In order to become a cooperating agency on an EIS, the agency must have “jurisdiction by 
law” or “have special expertise with respect to an environmental issue” (40 CFR 1501.6). The 
tribal governments argued that they had a legal jurisdiction over villages in the greater mine-
affected area and that their knowledge of the local socio-environmental conditions constituted a 
special expertise. Stakeholders and regulators working on the project noted that involving tribal 
governments in this way was a first for a NEPA analysis of a major mining project in Alaska. 
Becoming cooperating agencies meant that the tribes sat at the table alongside the federal 
regulators, providing technical reviews and advocating for special studies throughout the EIS 
 
7 The KRSMWG is a multi-stakeholder group of fishery users and Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game established in 1988 as a means of including local stakeholders in the management of the 
Kuskokwim River fishery.  
8 The names of the tribal governments in this paragraph adhere to their full, formal titles as they 
appear in the EIS documents. Some names are shortened in later mentions in the text for the sake 
of brevity and ease of reading. 
30 
 
process. The role came with some constraints; cooperating agency tribal representatives were 
prohibited from discussing details of the cooperating agency meetings outside the cooperating 
agencies group, including with their own constituents and non-cooperating agency tribal 
governments. 
Most of these tribal governments had limited staffing and resources to help them manage 
and review the numerous studies and documents that were part of the EIS process. In one village, 
for example, these responsibilities fell primarily on the tribal administrator, whose daily 
responsibilities were to coordinate and manage town government activities and services for the 
tribal council. This person reported that they quickly found the cooperating agency role 
overwhelming and excessively time consuming. That community reportedly contributed little to 
the EIS through its cooperating agency role. Interviews with other stakeholders indicated that some 
other tribal governments who had signed on as cooperating agencies had similar experiences.  
Of the six tribal governments, the villages of Chuathbaluk and Napaimute contributed most 
consistently and significantly to the process. In the case of Chuathbaluk, this relatively strong 
involvement was likely because the Chuathbaluk Tribal Council designated their Brownfields 
Coordinator9, a person already in an environmental role in the community, to handle their EIS 
activities, and they received technical support from a non-profit organization called the Center for 
Science and Public Participation (CSP2). Similarly, the village of Napaimute hired staff who had 
formerly worked as scientists with the US Forest Service and US Fish and Wildlife Service. These 
individuals were familiar with NEPA and the EIS process. In some instances, these individuals 
volunteered their time, and some received some funding through grants from the Western Mining 
Action Network10 or from the Indian Environmental General Assistance Program (IGAP), a 
program established by the federal government in 1992 to improve the capacity of Native 
American and Alaskan Native tribal governments to manage environmental programs.  
Tribal personnel in Napaimute and Chuathbaluk said that they believed their involvement 
as a cooperating agency was productive. They believed they were able to highlight data gaps in 
 
9 This position is responsible for considering cleanup and possible redevelopment of 




the EIS and push for additional scientific studies, making the process more comprehensive. They 
also believed that they were able to hold the Donlin Gold company accountable to answering their 
questions within the context of the cooperating agency meetings. They cited that one of their most 
significant contributions was ensuring the inclusion of impacts to rainbow smelt (Osmerus 
mordax) in the EIS. These fish are harvested by residents for food and are also an important prey 
species for larger riverine fish like pike and sheefish. Like salmon, rainbow smelt are anadromous, 
living most of their lives in the ocean only coming into rivers to spawn.  
Prior to the EIS, there was little western scientific documentation of rainbow smelt in the 
Kuskokwim, but residents’ local knowledge of the species pinpointed their spawning areas near 
the villages of Upper and Lower Kalskag. This contribution prompted a three-year survey 
documenting that the fish spawn over a two- to seven-day period in middle to late May. The eggs 
incubate on gravel and sand substrates as shallow as five feet for about three weeks (U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 2018, pp. 3.13-42). These results validated concerns about the effects of 
proposed river barging activities and prop wash from the barging tugboats. The Final EIS 
concluded: 
During the 2015 rainbow smelt spawning survey, spawning occurred as shallow as 
8.7 feet along a relatively confined channel segment. The propeller scour of passing tug 
traffic in such locations could have resulted in detectable incidents of injury or mortality 
to incubating fish eggs or population-level effects depending on the tug’s horsepower 
rating and engine speed. Because of the relatively shallow depth across this particular 
channel segment, it is unlikely that impacts to incubating rainbow smelt eggs could have 
been avoided by altering the line of travel of barge traffic. Similar impacts to other resident 
fish species that might spawn in shallow segments of the mainstem channel also would be 
at risk. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018, pp. 3.13-125) 
Despite the findings cooperating agency tribes expressed frustration that the Army Corps 
did not add any mitigation measures to the EIS’s alternatives to account for the findings. When 
asked about these frustrations, an Army Corps employee who worked on Donlin explained that 
the Army Corps does not have authority to enforce prop wash-related impacts. This person noted 
that NEPA has a broad disclosure mandate which includes things like the impacts on rainbow 
smelt. However, the law’s ability to impose environmental standards is limited to the permitting 
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authority of the federal agencies. In the case of Donlin the permitting authority of the Army Corps 
is specifically linked to the Clean Water Act and the River and Harbors Act. 
Interviewees from the cooperative agency tribes reported fatigue with the EIS process. 
Despite a sense of exhaustion, they expressed a duty to their communities, stating that local 
residents were relying on them to represent their interests. They said that they had insufficient time 
or technical expertise to review lengthy scientific documents at the level of detail they would have 
liked. They complained that federal agencies discussions were overly technical for tribal 
audiences. “It’s hard for me to get people to want to learn about this stuff” said one tribal 
representative, referring to the highly technical studies that make up the majority of the EIS. One 
tribal representative sighed and said, “I didn’t realize the study would be so big.” 
2.3.3 Stakeholder Comments in the EIS Process 
There were two formal public comment periods since the inception of the EIS process at 
Donlin: one during the scoping stage, and a second after the release of the Draft EIS. In 2012 
during the scoping stage, the Army Corps and Donlin held public meetings in 14 locations11. The 
intent of these meetings is to gather feedback from community members with the aim to identify 
the most salient concerns for consideration in the subsequent design alternatives analysis phase. In 
total, 468 people attended the EIS scoping meetings and 134 people provided comments (U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 2013). After the publication of the Draft EIS in November 2015, the 
Army Corps held public meetings in 17 locations12 in early 2016. The purpose of these meetings 
was to solicit public comment about the findings of the Draft EIS and incorporate these 
perspectives in the Final EIS and ROD. The Final EIS reports that the Draft EIS meetings had a 
total of 1004 attendees and 204 comments. In total (including comments received by mail and 
email) the Army Corps reported that they received 529 unique submissions containing over 5,000 
substantive comments on the Draft EIS (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018).  
 
11 Bethel, Aniak, Crooked Creek, Anchorage, Nunapitchuk, Akiak, McGrath, Hooper Bay, 
Toksook Bay, Quinhagak, Saint Mary’s, Emmonak, Holy Cross, and Kipnuk. 




The Army Corps coded the public comments into dozens of categories including: Acid 
Rock Drainage (Code: ARD); Birds (BIRD); Fish (FISH); Public Health (PHL); Traditional 
Culture and Way of Life (TWL); Research, Monitoring, and Evaluation Needs (RME); Legislative 
and Regulatory Process (LEG); and many others. These categories were broken into sub-categories 
which attempted to summarize the comments around a particular subset of the topic. For example, 
the Scoping Report described the comment group FISH 4 this way: 
FISH 4: Commenters are concerned that the project would adversely affect fish 
(and other wildlife including microorganisms) in the same way that the NYAC 
Mine13 [capitalization included in original] has affected fish in the Tuluksak River 
and its drainages. The Draft EIS should describe the potential risk and 
consequences of contaminated water releases from the mine. (U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 2013) 
Other comment groups provided even more detailed discussion in bullet lists, such 
as this comment group, FISH 12: 
FISH 12: Commenters are concerned that all fish species and habitats in the project 
area should be identified. The Draft EIS should:  
• Evaluate the types of resident and anadromous fish resources in American and 
Anaconda creeks 
• Identify streams, lakes, and other aquatic habitats that support anadromous or 
resident fish that may be affected by the proposed project 
• Identify streams crossed by the pipeline that support anadromous or resident 
fish species; and  
• Describe whether the kettle lakes have been surveyed for fish, as they are 
potential water sources. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2013) 
These types of categorizations placed stakeholder concerns within particular scientific 
disciplines so they might be analyzed by experts in the context of specialty studies. As the above 
 
13 The Nyac Mine is a gold mine located about 60 miles east of Bethel, also on tribal land owned 
by the Calista Corporation. 
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examples show, many comment summaries began to form the structure of the EIS’s scientific 
explorations. Undoubtedly, this approach captured some types of concerns well, especially those 
that fit well into an environmental science discipline. Comments categorized like these resulted in 
detailed scientific work on the fish species in the Kuskokwim and how the proposed mine might 
affect various aspects of their lifecycles.  
Responding to the above comments, the Final EIS (in the executive summary) included 
these statements under the heading “Fish and Aquatic Resources” when analyzing Donlin’s design 
alternatives: 
The Transportation Corridor includes roughly 199 miles of the Kuskokwim River, 
habitat characterized by sediment-rich, low-gradient, meandering channels of 
water depth that fluctuates with tides and seasons. At least 27 species of freshwater 
and anadromous fish are found here. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018) 
and; 
Just under 8 miles of streambed would be removed, representing about 8 percent 
of the Crooked Creek watershed. Habitat in American Creek and Anaconda 
Creek, which supports about 200 coho salmon, would be lost. Stream flow 
changes would be seasonal, with greatest reductions during winter months, 
affecting resident fish more than salmon. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018) 
More information supporting these statements can be found in the body of the Final EIS; 
and in even more detail in the studies themselves, detailed maps, and mitigation plan descriptions 
in various sub-sections of the report and appendices. Local residents who had experience in these 
scientific disciplines found this level of detail helpful at answering specific scientific questions. 
But, local residents, especially those with less formal scientific training, reported that they 
struggled to navigate the EIS and that they felt that important information was often difficult to 
find and poorly distilled for non-technical audiences.  
Although the scientific detail may be well captured and analyzed for some parts of the 
residents’ comments, other types of concerns were lost. To illustrate this point, re-consider FISH 
4. The commenters were indeed expressing a concern about fish biology, and they were 
expressing a concern about the environmental track records of the mining industry and its 
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regulators. Recognition of the multifaceted nature of stakeholder concerns underscores the fact 
that such concerns cannot be satisfactorily addressed by a technical study in a single scientific 
discipline. Embedded in the concerns are questions about stakeholders’ abilities to trust Donlin 
Gold, the Calista Corporation, regulators, and potential future property managers to adapt to 
changes and keep the stakeholders’ interests in mind. The concept of trustworthiness; in particular 
the track records of the company, property owner, and regulatory bodies; is not addressed at all 
in the EIS. Addressing comments like these more holistically requires a less disciplinarily siloed 
approach to triaging stakeholder comments than the one observed in the Donlin EIS. Future lead 
agencies should interrogate their NEPA implementation against the law’s interdisciplinary goals. 
2.3.4 Whom Do Local Stakeholders Trust? 
The Donlin project has a long history with the stakeholders in the Middle Kuskokwim 
region. The company (called Placer Dome in the earlier years) began exploring at Donlin in the 
mid-1990s and hired people from the region. In their first 110-day field season, which overlapped 
with the summer salmon runs, the operations manager at that time reported that the company had 
a 320% turnover rate among locally hired employees. In the years that followed, the company 
embarked on a community engagement campaign to understand and solve their turnover problem. 
Employees of the company and local community elders reported that Placer Dome employees 
interviewed employees who had quit, their supervisors, family members, and village elders.  
An anthropologist who studied the Yup’ik for decades observed that Yup’ik people are 
“typically modest and reserved, … made requests indirectly, were non-aggressive, and strove 
mightily to avoid confrontations” (Oswalt, 1990, p. xiii). Yup’ik interviewees for the present study 
described their own culture as “quiet” and “non-confrontational” and that withdrawing from a 
situation (like resigning from a job) was often viewed as preferable to being perceived as inciting 
a disagreement. Through their early engagements, company management learned that non-local 
supervisors did not understand these cultural dynamics. Company supervisors were also failing to 
recognize signs of struggle from local employees who were living in an exploration camp, 
separated from their families and subsistence lifestyles. The company learned more about the role 
that drug and alcohol abuse played among their employees and in their employees’ families. 
Perhaps most importantly, the company came to better understand the communities they were 
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working in, interacted intimately with local leaders and families, and developed deeper 
relationships with the people of the Middle Kuskokwim region.  
Learning from these experiences, the company hired and trained more local supervisors 
and gave people who were terminated for substance-abuse-related issues the option to return after 
a one-year waiting period and successful passage of a drug test. Two years later, the then-
operations manager reported that the turnover rate had dropped to around 5%. Donlin employees 
and many community members cite this early employment challenge as the event that drove the 
company to develop relationships and company-community trust. They believe that the 
employment challenge and its resultant company-community engagement set the stage for the 
company’s future relationship with the stakeholders of the Middle Kuskokwim region.  
Over the past two decades, the company (now under the name Donlin Gold) has maintained 
a significant presence in the Kuskokwim region throughout its exploration activities and into the 
EIS processes. Donlin Gold has sponsored numerous local events including sled dog races, high 
school basketball teams, and water safety initiatives. As a result, the company logo is seemingly 
ubiquitous in the Kuskokwim region: on life jackets, sweatshirts, coffee mugs, gymnasium score 
boards, local bulletin boards, and attached to numerous cultural and sporting events. Donlin Gold 
has a grant program where community organizations can apply for funding to support projects in 
language, culture, education, and environment. The grants have been used for dance festivals, 
basketball camps, school textbooks, Yup’ik dictionaries for local libraries, and taking local high 
school students on university tours. One community member expressed that “Donlin is so normal 
around here.”  
Beyond traditional corporate social responsibility activities, current and former Donlin 
staff are quick to highlight that the company has integrated into the local community as a corporate 
neighbor. During exploration activities, staff reported that they routinely helped village elders 
travel between villages by providing seats on company airplanes that transported employees 
between the villages and the work site. The company reported that they frequently sent employees 
to local funerals and helped provide food for guests. During a flood in the village of Crooked Creek 
in 2011, Donlin staff recounted how they suspended exploration activities to set up their camp as 
an emergency shelter and airlifted people out of the village.  
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However, some stakeholders spoke critically about Donlin Gold and its employees. Some 
interviewees were skeptical of the company, saying “Donlin tells you what they want you to know” 
– believing that the company was not always fully transparent, and that the company was 
downplaying the project’s risks and inflating its benefits. One interviewee believed that the 
company was pressuring reporters at the local newspaper to write favorably about the project. 
Another said that the company was “buying support” of village elders and other influential people 
through their grant program and other corporate social responsibility initiatives. Nevertheless, 
many of these same critics believed that Donlin followed the laws, and that the EIS work the 
company conducted was thorough. One steadfast Donlin critic even said “Donlin’s plans are much 
better than Pebble” – referring to the highly controversial proposed copper-gold mine nearly 200 
miles south.  
Although Donlin has earned a relatively high level of trust in the Middle Kuskokwim 
region, government agencies were viewed very differently. Supporters and opponents of the 
project commonly viewed environmental regulators as political actors whose goal was to permit a 
mine, rather than to protect the environment or the interests of local people. People involved in the 
EIS process expressed frustration with the amount of turnover at the Army Corps, especially in the 
role of the Donlin EIS Project Manager14. Interviewees said that they had trusted some of these 
managers but felt that others were either untrustworthy or that they never had sufficient time to get 
to know the person before they left the position.  
There was a persistent opinion among interviewees that people at federal regulatory 
agencies did not understand the Kuskokwim region, and that they were unwilling to learn. One 
community member said, “I don’t believe that the permitting folks understand the communities 
out here.” Others noted that employees of these agencies hardly ever spent more than a few hours 
in local communities, flying in from Anchorage prior to a public meeting or another appointment 
and flying back again immediately after. “You’ve already talked to us longer than anyone from 
the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]” a village employee said to the current study’s lead 
author mid-way through a 90-minute interview. During an interview with an employee based in 
 
14 Four different people managed the Donlin EIS for the Army Corps between 2012 and 2018. 




Anchorage working on Donlin for a federal agency, the employee seemed to confirm these 
interviewees’ concerns by saying “There is no outrage [to the mine] in the communities [of the 
Kuskokwim region]” – overlooking the region’s non-confrontational culture and demonstrating a 
lack of awareness of some residents who strongly oppose the mine and feel alienated by the EIS 
process. 
Community members and tribal employees also worried about the state agencies’ role in 
the Donlin permitting process. Many interviewees believed that the Alaskan Department of Natural 
Resources and the Alaskan Department of Environmental Quality had failed to properly enforce 
environmental laws at mines in other parts of the state. The author of the current study does not 
intend to validate nor refute these claims. Interviewees believed that these agencies’ ability to 
uphold environmental regulations was dependent upon who holds political office in the Alaska 
state capital of Juneau, and specifically how much money those office holders allocated to the 
agencies for travel to remote mining projects to conduct environmental monitoring activities.  
Regarding the Donlin EIS process specifically, many stakeholders expressed a frustration that 
some studies conducted by the state agencies for the EIS had not been made public saying that this 
lack of transparency limited stakeholders’ abilities to provide feedback on the project. During the 
lead author’s field visit, community members were especially focused on a Health Impact 
Assessment (HIA) conducted by the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services. An 
Alaskan Department of Health and Social Services employee who worked on the HIA said in an 
interview that the HIA for Donlin and its inclusion in the EIS were robust, especially compared to 
other EISs this person had worked on. The person reported being pleased with how the HIA was 
included in the Final EIS saying “human health was at the decision-making table.” Nevertheless, 
some project-opponents remain skeptical of the Army Corps and the Department of Health and 
Social Services’ motives for not releasing the original HIA report and speculated in interviews that 
the Army Corps did not accurately represent the HIA’s findings.  
Compared to the Draft EIS, the page count of the Final EIS ballooned to double the size -- 
over 10,000 pages in total. The Draft EIS that had been released six months earlier and was the 
basis for the final round of public comment meetings. Some stakeholders expressed anger that they 
did not get to comment on the Final EIS saying that they were forced to comment on incomplete 
information. A local radio station summarized the sentiment on the relative size of the Final EIS 
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by saying “It’s massive. It would change the Kuskokwim as we know it. And you only have 30 
days to read it.” (MacArthur, 2018).  
2.3.5 Alaska Ballot Measure 1 
Interviews for the current study suggested that overall support for building the Donlin mine 
was relatively high in the communities of the Middle Kuskokwim region, and there was less 
support for the mine in the Lower Kuskokwim region. Interviewees noted this disparity and 
suggested that this could be because the communities of the Middle Kuskokwim have seen greater 
benefits and have built stronger trust with Donlin through the company’s community engagement 
initiatives. It may also be that a higher percentage of residents of Middle Kuskokwim communities 
have worked for the company; Middle Kuskokwim residents who were current and former 
employees commonly expressed first-hand examples of why they trust the company. For example, 
one interviewee told of a small environmental spill where they observed the company management 
prioritizing remediation of the contamination and documenting the incident. Whatever the reason, 
the perception that Donlin had greater support among the most proximate Middle Kuskokwim 
communities, and less support in the Lower Kuskokwim, is corroborated by the state-wide election 
results of 2018 State Ballot Measure 1, commonly known as the “Stand for Salmon” initiative. 
Ballot Measure 1 would have applied new standards of permitting to infrastructure that 
would affect bodies of water used by salmon and other anadromous fish species. It was also seen 
as a mechanism to retard mining development. Petitioning for Ballot Measure 1’s inclusion on the 
state-wide ballot originated in the Bristol Bay area, where many local residents were opposed to 
the nearby Pebble mining project. The Pebble project’s opponents quickly became the face of 
support for the measure. The measure’s website argued that the measure improved safeguards to 
protect the environment and salmon-dependent communities, specifically from “dishonest foreign 
mining corporations”15. The Alaskan mining and oil and gas industries campaigned strongly in 
opposition to the measure, claiming it was both extreme and unnecessary, and that it would make 





the bulk of the nearly $12 million raised to oppose the measure, including $1.2 million in 
contributions from Donlin Gold (The Midnight Sun, 2018). 
When Alaskans went to the polls, Measure 1 was widely viewed as a referendum on the 
future of mining in Alaska. This framing was especially true in the Kuskokwim region where the 
Tribal Council in Bethel linked their support for Measure 1 specifically to their opposition to 
Donlin (Shallenberger, 2018). The vote in November 2018 closely coincided with the release of 
the Donlin Project’s ROD and the completion of the EIS process. For these reasons, the voting 
results in the Kuskokwim region may be interpreted as proxy for views on the Donlin Project at 
that moment in time.  
Figure 2.5 shows the results of the measure among the precincts in the Lower and Middle 
Kuskokwim region. There is clearly more support for mining among the communities of the 
Middle Kuskokwim (Lower Kalskag and upriver) where only 41% of voters supported the 
measure. Conversely, the voters of the Lower Kuskokwim (Tuluksak and downriver) voted 
strongly (68%) in favor of the measure. 
 
Figure 2.5: Map of the Middle and Lower Kuskokwim River precincts and the percent of voters 
who cast ballots in favor of 2018 State Ballot Measure 1, known as “Stand for Salmon”. The 
measure was widely viewed as a referendum on mining with those favoring mining voting against 
the measure. Note that support for the measure was strong from Tuluksak downriver, and 
opposition to the measure (support for mining) was stronger from Lower Kalskag and upriver. 
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The one outlier of this trend is the precinct of Chuathbaluk, which is located in the Middle 
Kuskokwim. That precinct voted strongly in favor of the measure. It is not entirely clear why 
Chuathbaluk’s stance on Measure 1 differs from other nearby communities. Interviews from the 
current study hint that the tribal government’s participation as a cooperating agency played a role 
in the village’s decreased level of support for the Donlin mine. This conclusion is difficult to 
quantitatively verify however, as the other tribal government that contributed significantly to the 
EIS, Napaimute, is a seasonal village and does not have its own voting precinct. Even more 
ambiguous are the causal mechanisms for this condition. Did the cooperating agency role decrease 
the village’s support for Donlin? Or, did their lack of support for Donlin motivate the village to 
participate as a cooperating agency? The current study cannot answer these questions.  
2.4 Conclusions 
Communities expressed frustrations with both how the Army Corps implemented the 
public comment process and how local stakeholders’ feedback was integrated into the Final EIS. 
Much of this frustration stemmed from the tension in NEPA between 1) building the foundation 
for the Army Corps and Bureau of Land Management’s subsequent permitting actions, and 2) 
NEPA’s mandate to examine and disclose a broad range of environmental impacts. The later 
portion of the Donlin EIS was undoubtedly expansive and included many issues that cooperating 
agency communities and the public at-large identified as important. Yet, even though studies like 
the rainbow smelt survey identified possible negative impacts from the project, they did not result 
in enforceable design changes nor permitting requirements.  
The NEPA and the EIS processes made some innovative strides toward greater stakeholder 
inclusion at Donlin, but still left some people feeling that their voices were not heard. The inclusion 
of tribal governments as cooperating agencies, for instance, was welcomed by interviewees as a 
positive means of stakeholder involvement, provided they had sufficient technical support to 
engage with the process. Cooperating agency communities that had technical support said that they 
felt they could push the company to better explain project alternatives, flag gaps they saw in the 
science, and push for more comprehensive analysis in some places. But, cooperating agency 




The current study suggests that local stakeholders’ trust of Donlin Gold, especially in the 
Middle Kuskokwim region, was an important part of the company’s successful navigation of the 
NEPA process. In the years of exploration work that the company and its predecessors conducted 
in the area, they came to understand the dynamics of the local culture, built relationships with local 
people, and became integrated into the socio-economic systems of the Middle Kuskokwim region. 
Entering the NEPA process, company employees felt that they were able to lean on these 
experiences to inform both their proposed design and their engagement strategies during the EIS 
process. “None of the stakeholder concerns surprised us” said one company official. Officials from 
the company reported that they were pleased with the EIS process and its outcomes. 
The Final EIS was lengthy and scientifically detailed. Many agency employees and some 
local stakeholders commented on the thoroughness of the scientific inquiry, especially compared 
to other EISs they had seen. However, that same scientific detail coupled with the seven-year 
timeline, and enormous page-count of the EIS also alienated many stakeholders, including some 
who were charged with representing their communities in the cooperating agency meetings. Every 
interviewee who held one of these positions complained about the report’s length and the scientific 
writing. Even the communities that had specialized technical support felt overwhelmed by the 
process and were unable to comment to their own satisfaction on the wide range of subjects that 
required review. 
Frustrations with the EIS’s length and technical nature were reported even more profoundly 
by stakeholders who were not involved in cooperating agency meetings. Interviewees expressed 
difficulty distilling the EIS’s conclusions to answer the question they really wanted to know: how 
the project was likely to affect their lives.  Many of these people had engaged with Donlin Gold 
employees for years prior to the EIS, expressing thoughts and concerns throughout the history of 
the company’s activities in the area. These people commonly said that they had more access to the 
company directly than through the EIS process and that the regulators who oversaw the process 
had not listened to them. They expressed frustration that they were sometimes forced to comment 
on the EIS based on incomplete information (such as the late-released HIA), and they desired to 




In contrast to their long history of engagement with the Donlin Gold company, many local 
stakeholders had little or no first-hand experience with the regulatory agencies until the EIS 
process began. Local stakeholders expressed many negative perceptions about the Army Corps 
and other agencies and those agencies’ implementation of the NEPA process. Many stakeholders 
held the opinion that the agencies exist to permit projects for companies, not to protect local 
stakeholders or the environment. One interviewee stated, “It’s not fair that two people [The Army 
Corps and Donlin Gold] are going to make this choice” Another suggested that the problem was 
more related to agencies’ lack of cultural understanding of the Yup’ik people specifically and rural 
Alaska in general. “[The agencies] don’t understand the people out here” and “The agencies do 
not work well with tribes” said interviewees expressing frustration about times they felt that 
regulators did not listen to them or failed to understand their concerns. 
Regulators clearly entered the Donlin EIS process with less local experience in the 
Kuskokwim region than Donlin Gold. Stakeholders’ lack of trust in the regulatory agencies 
reflected this shortcoming. The permitting actions vs. general disclosure tension in NEPA 
exacerbated this problem. If agency employees had spent more time in the Kuskokwim region, 
they might have improved their trustworthiness in the eyes of local stakeholders. Perhaps even 
more importantly, the education of local stakeholders about NEPA (particularly its limitations) 
and the methods of engagement with local stakeholders during the process could also be improved. 
One Kuskokwim region resident suggested that the agencies hold workshops16 with local 
stakeholders so that agency employees and community members could work to understand and 
address environmental challenges as a team, rather than the one-way format of public comment 
meetings. The author believes that an approach like this deserves consideration for future EIS 
work. 
Undoubtedly, a major mining project like Donlin will have significant and complex 
impacts on the environment. Detailed impact assessments are unquestionably necessary to 
understand and characterize the baseline environmental conditions and the potential impacts of the 
proposed mine. However, if the regulatory procedures and results are excessively segregated into 
 
16 This idea has also been promoted at the embattled Pebble project as a means to improve 
community participation in that project’s development and permitting decision processes (Holley 
& Mitcham, 2016). 
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those related to subsequent permitting and those that are not, the outcomes of the EIS risk become 
detached from stakeholders’ concerns. As this study showed, this dichotomy can leave many 
stakeholders feeling that their concerns are not being taken seriously and that the conclusions of 
the NEPA process are illegitimate. Regulators must tailor their management of the NEPA process 
to maximize the EIS’s rigor and elevate meaningful contributions from local stakeholders 
including local knowledge of the environment.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE INDICATORS OF MINING COMPANY-STAKEHOLDER CONFLICT: A 
LINEAR REGRESSION APPROACH 
 
3.1 Abstract 
This study uses multiple linear regression models to identify the factors that are the best 
indicators of mining company-stakeholder conflict. The study examines a database of 23 mining 
properties which includes social and environmental indicators from an anonymous major mining 
company (Company X), data on company-stakeholder conflict events, and macroeconomic 
statistics for the countries where the properties are located. The database was used to develop 39 
multiple linear regression models using a forward stepwise selection algorithm. The paper 
discusses the variables which showed statistical significance (p <0.05) to company-stakeholder 
conflict in the greatest number of models. This study concludes that the following conditions have 
the most statistically significant relationships to conflict: past mining conflict in the subject 
property’s region, anticipated physical and economic displacement of local stakeholders, and past 
conflict at the subject property itself. This study presents the model with the most explanatory 
power (R2 = 0.35) and demonstrates how this methodology might be used to predict future 
company-stakeholder conflict at the Donlin Gold property in Western Alaska.    
3.2 Introduction 
Conflicts between mining companies and communities are increasingly common and 
increasingly costly (Franks, 2009). Deposits like Pebble in Alaska (Holley & Mitcham, 2016), Far 
South East/Lepanto  in the Philippines (Stark, et al., 2006), Minas Conga in Peru (Woods, 2014), 
and others are slated for development by companies, but remain perpetually resisted by local and 
international stakeholders who see these mines as incompatible with their communities and natural 
environments. These conflicts can last years and cost millions of dollars to companies (Davis & 
Franks, 2014), host governments (Jamasmie, 2015), and mining opponents. Mining-sympathetic 
governments in Peru (BBC News, 2012), Myanmar (Jamasmie, 2014) and Indonesia (Michaels, 
2011) have directed violence at mining opponents, killing and injuring demonstrators. Mining 
opponents may spend years and many thousands of dollars resisting a mining venture and suffer 
financial repercussions for a failed opposition (Barnsley, 2018). Stakeholder opposition to mining 
has become so common that mining companies like Rio Tinto; consultancies like Environmental 
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Resources Management, and SRK Consulting; and investment firms like Ernst and Young 
increasingly report that “above ground” risks now outweigh “technical” risks to the mining 
industry (Environmental Resources Management, 2016; Rio Tinto, 2011; Upton, 2016; Mitchell, 
2019). Industry watchdog groups have labeled the current state of company-community conflict 
in some countries “Condition Critical” (Oxfam America, 2009). 
What can mining companies do to avoid properties that have high likelihoods of company-
stakeholder conflict? Which features of a mining property suggest that the property is at higher 
risk for conflict? This research employs multiple linear regression modeling to answer this 
question. Economic scholars commonly employ regression modeling because the method allows 
researchers to examine complex systems and isolate the effects of particular variables of interest. 
Using regression modeling techniques, scholars have tested countless systems including: the 
indicators of a country’s participation in International Monetary Fund lending programs (Conway, 
1994), the effects of natural resource abundance on economic development (Sachs & Warner, 
2001), and the factors that elevate a country’s risk for an outbreak of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004). 
As a matter of convention, the present study uses all uppercase notation to refer to specific 
variables in the database (e.g. CONFLICT). Multi-word variables are linked with an underscore 
to indicate that they are a single variable (e.g. MINING_LEGACY). Themes and broader concepts 
are written in lowercase (e.g. conflict, and mining legacy). The dependent variable in this study is 
CONFLICT. This variable represents the mining-company stakeholder conflict that occurred at a 
particular mining property after the independent variables were recorded. This research tests which 
social and environmental variables are statistically significant indicators of CONFLICT.  
3.2.1 Company-Stakeholder Conflict in the Literature 
This section paves the way for discussions about the construction of this study’s database. 
In the literature discussion that follows, the present study’s relevant variables are indicated in 
parenthesis to show how the variables in the database connect to the literature and broader themes 
of environmental and social justice. There is a large body of scholarly work examining mining 
company-stakeholder conflicts through qualitative case studies. These studies include a wide range 
of mining commodities, geographic locations, and conflict scenarios. The overarching conclusion 
of this literature is that stakeholders resist mining when they anticipate environmental impacts they 
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deem as unacceptable, or when they lack sufficient representation in the mining decision making 
processes (Conde, 2017). And still, the individual conflict cases are as unique as the locations, 
communities, and companies they involve. 
Mines often compete for physical space with local communities who have settled on and 
around the mineral deposit. Developing the mine frequently requires displacing local agricultural 
activities, and in some cases, entire communities (COMMMUNITY_RESETTLEMENT)  
(Downing, 2002). Owen and Kemp (2015) showed how physical displacement of communities 
created risks for the affected people despite international efforts to establish norms around 
displaced peoples’ rights to compensation, livelihood restoration, and handling of stakeholder 
grievances. They note that displacement was often forced (rather than voluntary) leaving affected 
stakeholders with little formal power to negotiate favorable returns. Terminski (2013) stated that 
mining resettlements can be particularly “socially inflammatory” (p. 61) when compared to other 
development-induced involuntary resettlements (like the construction of dams and  transportation 
infrastructure) because mining displacement is more likely to occur in places where individual 
property rights are weak and displaced people are vulnerable. 
Artisanal mining is a critical economic activity in rural communities of mineral resource-
rich developing countries (ARTISANAL_MINING) (Hentschel, et al., 2002; Tschakert, 2009). 
Mining companies may displace artisanal miners to make way for large-scale mine development. 
When threatened with possible displacement, artisanal mining stakeholders frequently resist the 
activities of large-scale mining (Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007).  Unlike other livelihoods like 
agriculture, artisanal miners frequently operate informally, and may be regarded by the state as 
operating illegally (Hentschel, et al., 2002; Teschner, 2013). Underpinning artisanal mining 
conflicts are divergent land access systems (LAND_OWNERSHIP). Unlike large-scale mining 
firms, informal artisanal miners typically receive permission to mine through local land-tenure 
systems that are unrecognized by the state, further limiting the formal paths for adequate restitution 
and conflict resolution (Smith, et al., 2017). 
Access to water is another common theme in many mining conflicts. In arid climates, 
competition for fresh water can pin companies against local stakeholders 
(WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY). Li (2015) documented calls of “Water, yes! Gold, no!” by anti-
mining protestors in Peru as they fought to stop the Minas Conga project that would have destroyed 
48 
 
four mountain lakes the protestors viewed as culturally and agriculturally important. Holley and 
Mitcham (2016) discussed conflict over the proposed Pebble Mine in Alaska. There, stakeholder 
concerns included acid mine drainage (ARD_POTENTIAL), which could potentially damage the 
downstream salmon fishery (Bebbington & Williams, 2008). The company initially attempted to 
deescalate the conflict through an independently-facilitated public dialog on the projects’ 
environmental studies, but the process was never completed because the mining firm Anglo 
American withdrew from the investment saying that it wanted to focus on “lower risk projects” 
(Cockerham, 2013).  
Mining’s proximity to protected areas or sacred locations is also documented in the conflict 
literature (PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA). Akpalu and Parks (2007) discussed the case 
of tropical rainforests in Ghana that have religious as well as economic significance to local 
populations. They suggested that government taxation policies could limit conflict between mining 
firms and stakeholders over forest resources. Yet, they noted the current mining taxation rates in 
Ghana were too low to properly balance the prioritization of these resources. In the case of the 
Indian state of Odisha, the government had attempted to place monetary values on forests in order 
to prioritize some land for development and other land to be preserved for its environmental 
qualities. But, after local stakeholders protested planned bauxite mining in a forest they regarded 
as sacred, courts sided with the protestors claims, halting future mining indefinitely (Temper & 
Martinez-Alier, 2013).  
The role of government mechanisms of power and decision-making are cited as important 
factors in company-stakeholders conflict (GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY). Arellano-Yaguas 
(2011) concluded that local governments that lacked the capacity to manage and deploy mining 
revenues for society’s benefit exacerbated company-stakeholder conflict in Peru. Conflict can also 
arise when government is ineffective at securing the consent of local stakeholders for mining 
activities (Smith, et al., 2017). Alternatively, Costanza (2016) provided an example of how 
effective government institutions mitigated company-stakeholder conflict in rural Guatemala by 
establishing strong stakeholder participation mechanisms. These mechanisms led to effective use 
of mining revenues in local economic development projects. The problem of legitimacy is 
especially important in the context of mining projects on indigenous lands where international 
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standards mandate that companies and governments obtain free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC) from indigenous stakeholders in advance of mining (Mahanty & McDermott, 2013).  
Why some stakeholders resist mining is the focus of much scholarly work, but a few studies 
explore the mechanisms of mining opposition through a lens of economic rationalism. Haslam and 
Tanimoune (2016) correlated Latin American mine site features with company-stakeholder 
conflict using logit modeling. Their study concluded that the drivers of conflict were linked to 
economic factors like the economic opportunities in local communities (GDP_PER_CAPITA), the 
mining firm being foreign owned or owned by a state (as opposed to locally owned), and the 
ineffectiveness of local institutions at serving mine-proximate communities 
(GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY). Work by Avic and Fernandez-Salvador (2016) in Ecuador 
compared the effectiveness of mining resistance movements at the Mirador and Intag projects. 
Their work concluded that stakeholders must have a critical mass of opposition under a unified 
identity to oppose mining companies. These findings suggested that stakeholders’ willingness to 
engage in conflict may be a function of their perceptions of their economic losses and their 
perceived likelihood of successfully stopping the mine. 
The involvement of an international non-governmental organization can increase the 
exposure of a company-stakeholder conflict (Urkidi, 2010). The present study includes negative 
publicity of a mining company by an NGO in the definition of a company-stakeholder conflict 
(CONFLICT_HISTORY) per the example of Davis and Franks (2014). Adyin et al (2017) used 
network modeling to explore why NGOs may choose to support some mining opposition 
movements and not others. They concluded that an NGO can increase the perception that their 
opposition to mining has been successful by involving a network of NGOs in their activities. They 
also found that NGOs may become involved in an anti-mining conflict that is perceived to be 
successful in order to increase the perception of their own NGO’s legitimacy. 
Present and future conflicts can be rooted in long-standing grievances from past conflicts 
(CONFLICT_HISTORY). Hilson and Yakovleva (2007) provided an example from Prestea, 
Ghana, where old grievances from company-stakeholder conflicts in the 1980s spurred repeated 
episodes of company-community conflict into the late 2000s. Li (2015) concluded that 
stakeholders resisted mining because companies exhibited patterns of behavior which entrench 
patterns of distrust. Dissatisfaction with one mining project may lead to mining opposition at other 
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properties (MINING_LEGACY). The mining protests at Tambogrande for example, were credited 
with inspiring mining opposition movements at other properties in Peru (Haarstad & Floysand, 
2007). 
3.2.2 Attempts to Resolve Company-Stakeholder Conflict 
Scholarly work and many international watchdog groups have largely concluded that 
conflicts originate when mining companies disregard the concerns of local stakeholders (Jenkins, 
2004; Conde, 2017) or when companies lack sufficient understanding of the complex socio-
environmental spaces where they mine (Li, 2015). Mining companies have high profile corporate 
social responsibility programs through which companies make investments in social and economic 
development of local stakeholder communities. These programs invest in job training for local 
stakeholders, build schools and healthcare facilities, train teachers and healthcare workers, and 
provide start-up resources for local business (Raufflet, et al., 2014). It is not clear how effective 
these programs have been at reducing company-stakeholder conflict. Critics still argue that 
corporate social responsibility programs are driven by evolving industry norms rather than 
stakeholders concerns (Dashwood, 2012) or that these programs fail to address the fundamental 
injustices that underpin corporate relationships with local people (Owen & Kemp, 2017). 
In conjunction with the efforts of individual companies, international organizations like the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and industry groups like the International Council on 
Mining and Metals (ICMM) have developed best practice guidelines for mining company 
engagement with stakeholders. The IFC’s Environmental and Social Performance Standards direct 
companies to track how their businesses impact the following: labor, resource use efficiency, local 
communities, land and resettlement, biodiversity, indigenous peoples, and cultural heritage 
(International Finance Corporation, 2012). Formally, the Performance Standards only apply to 
companies in which the IFC invests, but they have nevertheless become the de facto mining 
industry standard for environmental and social practices. Mirroring the IFC, the ICMM has a set 
of guidelines and toolkits around environmental and social issues for their member companies 
(ICMM, 2018). Both organizations advocate that strong social and environmental performance 
reduces risks to companies.  
Although the goals of the IFC standards and ICMM guidelines are much broader than 
simply reducing company-stakeholder conflict, mining companies have adopted these standards 
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(at least in part) with conflict-reduction goals. Major mining firms now track the IFC and ICMM-
prescribed variables across their project portfolios. The anonymous mining company which 
supplied the social and environmental data for this study (we call Company X) is a signatory to 
the ICMM and internally assesses its mining properties against the IFC Performance Standards. 
Although the results of the present study are most directly applicable to Company X itself, the 
company’s indicators were intentionally constructed to mirror those of internationally recognized 
standards, which provides an opportunity for the conclusions of this study to be applied across the 
industry.  
3.3 Database Construction Method 
This work uses a database of information from 23 projects and mines, with 19 independent 
variables for each property. The properties come from five continents (Africa, Asia, Australia, 
North America, and South America). The properties are located in developing countries (n = 11) 
and developed countries (n = 12). The author populated the database with information from three 
sources: social and environmental due diligence ratings for these properties by Company X, 
macroeconomic indicators from the World Bank, and a catalog of conflict events compiled by the 
present study’s author.  
3.3.1 Mining Company’s Social and Environmental Due Diligence Ratings 
Company X’s data on social and environmental ratings were compiled as part of that 
company’s environmental and social due diligence process. Each property is one in which 
Company X has an ownership stake (n = 11), or a property that Company X considered acquiring 
through a merger or acquisition (n = 12). Company X rated each social or environmental condition 
on a 0 to 4 scale, with 4 being the most favorable condition from the perspective of the company. 
Company X’s due diligence assessments were conducted between April 2016 and April 2018.  
Company X’s original due diligence analysis includes six variables it categorized as 
environmental, and ten categorized as social. Of these, the present study’s database adopts three 
environmental variables and six social variables. These variables are shown in Table 3.1. Three of 
Company X’s environmental variables and two social variables were not included in the present 
study’s database because they represented similar conditions to, and correlated strongly with, 
another variable that is included. For example, for the present study’s variable 
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WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY, Company X asked the question “Is this project located in 
sensitive watershed such as in municipal water supply?” This question is similar to another 
variable in Company X’s analysis where the company asks the question “Is obtaining a water 
supply a risk to the project?” Since these variables correlated strongly with one another and are 
both assessing water resource sensitivity, the later was excluded from the present study’s analysis. 
One environmental variable was not included due to a lack of statistical variation. For this 
variable Company X asked, “Is there a negative water balance due to low precipitation and high 
evaporation?” Of the 23 total projects in the database, the company gave 21 of them a rating of 4 
out of 4 on this question, and the remaining three were given a 2 out of 4 rating. The author 
determined that this variable showed insufficient variation to provide value to this analysis.  
Table 3.1: Social and environmental variables used in this study. These variables were assessed by 
Company X on a 0 to 4 scale as part of their environmental and social due diligence process. The 
Question column includes Company X’s defining question as it appears in their due diligence 
process. Company X’s criteria for each of these variable’s rating and their normalized rank 
conversion values is show in Table 3.9 in Section 3.10 Supplemental Material. 
Variable Category Question 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY Environmental 
Is this project located in sensitive watershed 
such as in municipal water supply?  
ARD_POTENTIAL Environmental Is there ARD [Acid rock drainage] potential? 
PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA Environmental 
Is the project located in or near a protected 
area? [protected forest, natural heritage area, 
national parks, etc.] 
LAND_OWNERSHIP Social Who owns the property? 
SOCIAL_UNREST Social 
Is there a current or historical presence of 
social conflict or unrest within 2 hours of the 
project site?  
MINING_LEGACY Social 
Is there a current or historical presence of 
mining activities with a negative 
legacy/reputation within close proximity of 
the project site?   
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY Social 
Is there a sense of the level of local 
government capacity? [lower capacity 
governments received a lower rating]  
COMMUNITY_RESETTLEMENT Social Will a resettlement be necessary?  
ARTISANAL_MINING Social 
Is there a presence of artisanal and small-




The author converted Company X’s 0 to 4 ratings into normalized rankings. This 
transformation means that these indicators were analyzed relative to each other, rather than in 
absolute terms. This transformation also helps to avoid statistical challenges associated with using 
ranked categorical data (Cohen, 1988). The most favorably rated property (or properties) in an 
indicator category received a transformed value of 1.00, and the least favorably rated property (or 
properties) received a rating of 0.00. For example, if the company rated a water resources indicator 
at five different properties with values of 2, 3, 3, 4, 4; the analysis would rank these as 0th, 1st (tied), 
1st (tied), 3rd (tied), 3rd (tied), and then transform these rankings set into the normalized values 0.00, 
0.33, 0.33, 1.00, 1.00 by dividing them by the highest ranking value (3 in this example). Table 3.9 
in the 3.10 Supplemental Material shows how to convert each variable to its corresponding 
normalized ranks. 
The literature on mining company-stakeholder conflict suggests that conflict can be 
multivariate. To allow for this possibility in the models, the author created some simple index 
variables from the nine primary social and environmental variables. The 
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX captures the average magnitude of all environmental variables. The 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX considers possible interdependence of water and land related 
stresses. The GOVERANCE_INDEX captures the region’s political stability. And, the 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX considers the social and economic displacement of local 
stakeholders at the properties.  
Table 3.2: Index variables built from the nine primary social and environmental variables. 




Index of LAND_OWNERSHIP and 
WATER_SENSITIVITY. An indicator of local 
stakeholders’ overall sensitivity to environmental 
and land tenure changes.  
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX Environmental 
Index of the three environmental variables: 
WATER_SENSITIVITY, ARD_POTENTIAL, and 
PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA. An 
indicator of the overall environmental conditions at 
the property.  
GOVERNANCE_INDEX Social 
Index of GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY and  
SOCIAL_UNREST. An indicator of the governance 
conditions affecting the property.  
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX Social 
Index of ARTISANAL_MINING and 
COMMUNITY_RESETTLEMENT. An indicator 
of the effect of displacement of existing activities 




3.3.2 Conflict Events 
The data for the variables CONFLICT and CONFLICT_HISTORY were generated by the 
present study’s author. These variables are both measured in units of average number of conflict 
events per year. CONFLICT captures the period of time after Company X’s due diligence analysis. 
CONFLICT_HISTORY captures the period of time prior to the environmental and social due 
diligence analysis. For each property, the author identified a major local newspaper and searched 
the archives of the paper from January 1, 2005 through October 1, 2019. The author cataloged the 
following types of events per the conflict definition criteria of Davis and Franks (2014) and the 
author’s previous example (Teschner & Holley, 2019). Each event represents an event where the 
promotor aimed to halt or delay mining-related activities:  
1) Procedural conflict (litigation, formal complaints to administrative bodies, or negative 
publicity through international non-governmental organizations [NGOs])  
2) Physical protest (marches, strikes, or blockades) 
3) Violence inflicted on people or property  
Following the author’s previous example (Teschner & Holley, 2019), and to retain 
consistency with Davis and Franks’ (2014) conflict definitions, the author grouped temporally 
related actions by the same stakeholder(s). For example, if a stakeholder group held protest 
marches opposing a mining project and then filed a legal action against the mining project in close 
temporal proximity, the two activities would be recorded together as a single conflict event.  
Conflict events that occurred prior to the mining company’s social and environmental due 
diligence analysis (CONFLICT_HISTORY) would have been known to the evaluators at the time 
of their analysis and may have influenced their ratings. This is especially true for the variable 
MINING_LEGACY which consider the company-stakeholder conflict history of the region. 
Conflict events that occurred after the due diligence analysis (CONFLICT) could not have been 
known to Company X, and therefore these events serve as an effective dependent variable from 
which to test the indicators.  
Company X’s due diligence analyses were not conducted concurrently and therefore the 
pre- and post- due diligence time periods are of different lengths for each property. To account for 
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these variations, CONFLICT and CONFLICT_HISTORY are normalized by time and recorded in 
units of conflict events per year. For example, if the company conducted its due diligence analysis 
on October 1, 2016, and the news source’s first coverage of the property was October 1, 2010, then 
the author would divide the pre-analysis conflict events by 6.0 years and save this value as the 
datum for CONLFICT_HISTORY. The post-analysis conflict events would be divided by 3.0 
years and saved as the property’s datum for CONFLICT. If a property had news coverage predating 
2005, then January 1, 2005 was used as the earliest coverage date.  The author chose 2005 as the 
starting point for the analysis because newspapers typically had archives dating back this far. 
3.3.3 Macro-Economic Indicators 
A country’s dependence on mining and oil and gas has been linked to underwhelming 
macroeconomic development outcomes (Davis & Tilton, 2005). Some scholars suggest that this 
factor contributes to social discontent with mining (Loayza, et al., 2013). The database in the 
present study includes three macro-economic variables. These variables control for country-wide 
conditions that may affect company-stakeholder conflict outcomes. Two variables are measures of 
the country’s economic development level (GPD_PER_CAPITA_RANK, and HDI_RANK), and 
the third is a measure of the host country’s dependence on mineral resources 
(MINERAL_EXPORTS).  
Table 3.3: Macro-economic variables from the World Bank’s development indicators database 
(World Bank, 2019). 
Variable Category Description 
GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK Macro-economic 
The host country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capital rank (of 225 countries). Lower values indicate a 
higher GDP per capita. 
HDI_RANK Macro-economic 
The host country’s rank on the Human Development Index 
(HDI). Lower values indicate higher levels of development. 
MINERAL_EXPORTS Macro-economic 
The host country’s mineral exports a share of its total 
exports. Higher values indicate more export dependence on 
mining. 
 
3.3.4 Data Quality  
This analysis partially relies on data provided by Company X. The company compiled 
these data for the purpose of conducting their own internal risk analysis. The evaluation of the 
properties was not perfectly uniform. Properties were evaluated over a period of approximately 
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two years, and different people within the company evaluated different properties. Moreover, the 
evaluators and the company had different levels of experience with the subject properties and based 
their ratings on varying quantities and qualities of information. The most obvious disparity in the 
level of information is between properties the company owns (n = 11) versus those it considered 
acquiring (n = 12). Ratings for those properties the company owns were conducted by site-based 
staff who have detailed experience at the property and with the property’s stakeholders. Ratings 
for potential acquisitions were conducted primarily by corporate-level staff relying on data 
supplied by the property’s owner and from publicly available information. 
Both the company’s properties and potential acquisition properties are evenly distributed 
across developing and developed countries. The average GPD_PER_CAPITA_RANK value for 
company owned properties is 77.4 and the potential acquisition properties is 74.6. However for all 
but two variables in the database, the mean values were lower (more risk) for the potential 
acquisition properties than they were for the properties the company owned (the exceptions are 
GOVERNANCE_INDEX and GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY). Interestingly the mean values of 
CONFLICT for the company owned and potential acquisition properties are very similar (0.16 and 
0.17 respectively), and the CONFLICT_HISTORY mean is lower (less conflict) for the potential 
acquisition properties than the owned properties (0.06 versus 0.11). These observations suggest 
that Company X’s employees introduced a positive biased toward their own properties when rating 
the variables. 
Of the 23 properties, eight have non-zero values for CONFLICT and six have non-zero 
values for CONFLICT_HISTORY. This research relied on publicly available news sources to 
populate these two variables. For some properties, especially those located in countries where press 
freedom is limited, company-stakeholder conflicts may be under reported. Reporters Without 
Borders produces an annual Press Freedom Index in which they rate countries on a scale of 0 to 
100, with lower values representing more press freedom. The present study’s database contains 
two properties that are in countries with 2019 Press Free Index Ratings between 35 and 55 
(categorized as “bad” by the index) (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Of these two properties, 
the present study’s author identified conflict events at one of them, but not the other. The present 
study’s author could not verify whether or not unreported conflict events occurred at this property 
nor any of the others in the database. 
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Finally, the database includes a wide variety of variables, but these variables are far from 
an exhaustive list of the impacts that mines can have on the environment and society. The omitted 
conditions include some that are considered important by international standards like the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015). For example, the database is 
missing environmental data on air quality including emissions related to climate change, and how 
a mine might affect local biodiversity including endangered and threatened species. Some social 
conditions are also absent, including how a mine would affect human health, or gender inequality. 
The database also lacks variables that might positively influence stakeholders’ perceptions of 
mining like the number of people employed at the property or the tax revenues that the company 
pays to local government. 
3.4 Methods 
This section discusses the statistical methods the study employs to test whether social and 
environmental variables are indicators of mining company-stakeholder conflict. This study uses 
CONFLICT as its dependent variable. This variable represents the average conflict event 
frequency at a property after Company X recorded the social and environmental variable values.  
The author examined the Pearson’s correlation coefficients () of the dependent variable 
CONFLICT to all independent variables (See Table 3.4)1 to determine which variables show the 
strongest stand-alone relationships to CONFLICT. This study discusses the correlation 
coefficients’ magnitudes per the example of Cohen (1988, pp. 75-108): Coefficients with absolute 
values less than 0.30 have a weak correlation, 0.30 to 0.50 a moderate correlation, and greater than 
0.50 a strong correlation. The author also examined the -values of all of the independent variables 
with respect to each other for the purpose of evaluating multicollinearity (See Table 3.10 in the 
3.10 Supplemental Material). 
The author employed a forward stepwise selection algorithm to identify the multiple linear 
regression model that best predicts CONFLICT from the suite of independent variables in the 
database. To avoid over-interpreting the data, the present study limits the algorithm to regression 
 
1 A complete table of correlation coefficients for all variables is included in the Supplemental 
Material at the end of this chapter. 
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models with two independent variables. This forward stepwise selection algorithm starts by 
selecting the variable with the strongest correlation to CONFLICT, in this case 
MINING_LEGACY, and then constructs a series of models using MINING_LEGACY and the 
remaining variables. The algorithm then notes the model with the largest R2 value in this series.  
The forward stepwise selection process can fail to identify the most predictive model when 
the variable with the strongest ρ-value to the dependent variable is not contained in the most 
predictive model. To guard against this possibility, the author employed this same algorithm five 
additional times, each time forcing the algorithm to start with the next strongest CONFLICT 
corollary. In addition to MINING_LEGACY (ρ = -0.48), these variables are:  HDI_RANK (0.46), 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX (-0.44), CONFLICT_HISTORY (0.44), 
ARTISANAL_MINING (-0.43), and GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK (0.42) (See Table 3.4).  
Independent variables that are multicollinear should not be place into the same linear 
regression models. This study considers independent variables with correlations greater than or 
equal to absolute values of 0.30 as multicollinear (Cohen, 1988, pp. 75-108). After models with 
multicollinear variables were excluded, the algorithm produced a total of 39 unique models from 
which to choose the most predictive model. A full table of these models, including their R2 values 
and statistically significant variables is shown in Table 3.11 in Section 3.10 Supplemental 
Material. 
Finally, the author demonstrates the possibilities for this modeling approach by applying 
the study’s most predictive model to the case of the Donlin property in Western Alaska. Donlin is 
a large gold deposit currently in the advanced stages of permitting. The author worked with 
Company X to rate Donlin for each of the variables used in this study using the same method that 
the company used in its due diligence analysis. Donlin is an interesting case for this demonstration 
because the site has a documented history dating back over a decade, yet the first (and only 
documented conflict event to date) occurred in 2018. This demonstration shows how the risk of 





Table 3.4: Pearson’s correlation coefficients () of independent variables with the dependent 
variable CONFLICT.  
Indicator Category ρ with CONFLICT  




PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX Social -0.44 
CONFLICT_HISTORY Social 0.44 




COMMUNITY_RESETTLEMENT Social -0.38 
GOVERNANCE_INDEX Social -0.36 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY Social -0.34 
SOCIAL_UNREST Social -0.29 
LAND_OWNERSHIP Social 0.13 
ARD_POTENTIAL Environmental 0.10 




ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX Environmental 0.07 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX Social & 
Environmental 
0.06 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY Environmental -0.03 
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results of multiple linear regression models and the variables that 
are the best indicators of CONFLICT. The study found that variables measuring past conflict, and 
the mine’s predicted physical and economic displacement of local stakeholders are the most 
statistically significant indicators of future company-stakeholder conflict. The study also found 
that the environmental variables in this study were not good indicators of future conflict. The 
following section discusses how these variables manifested in the study’s models. 
3.5.1 Regression Models 
The most predictive model (R2 = 0.35) comprises the independent variables that rate the 
region’s mining legacy (MINING_LEGACY) and the past conflict frequency at the subject mining 
property (CONFLICT_HISTORY). In this model, MINING_LEGACY is significant at the 95% 
confidence level and CONFLICT_HISTORY is significant at the 90% confidence level (Table 
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3.5). This model suggests that the best indicators of future conflict are past instances of conflict at 
the subject property itself and from other nearby properties. It makes sense that these two variables 
form the most predictive model because they directly measure past conflict between mining 
companies and stakeholders in and around the subject property. All the other variables in this study 
are one step removed from conflict itself, and instead measure particular issues that may or may 
not create strain in those relationships.  
Although this model only explains about a third of the variation in CONFLICT, the 
relationship between MINING_LEGACY and the model’s constant is compelling; the values are 
both approximately 0.30. Since the maximum possible value of MINING_LEGACY is 1.00, the 
model suggests that a property in a region with a highly positive mining legacy (a value of 1.00) 
will have a future conflict-frequency that is almost entirely dependent on the conflict history at the 
property itself. These coefficients also mean that the most favorably rated possibility 
(MINING_LEGACY = 1.00 and CONFLICT_HISTORY = 0.00) will have a predicted 
CONFLICT value of 0.01 (an average of one conflict every 100 years). Intuitively this makes 
sense; no mining property has a zero chance of conflict and the least conflict-prone mining 
properties should have expected conflict values that are very small but not negative. 
Table 3.5: Multiple regression for CONFLICT using MINING_LEGACY and 
CONFLICT_HISTORY as independent variables. 













 0.59 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.00 0.00 






Confidence Interval 95% 
Regression Table Lower Upper 
Constant 0.31 0.11 2.89 0.01 0.09 0.54 
MINING_LEGACY -0.30 0.13 -2.21 0.04 -0.58 -0.02 
CONFLICT_HISTOR
Y 0.57 0.29 1.93 0.07 -0.04 1.18 
 
The algorithm identified two other models with R2 values greater than 0.30. The first model 
used CONFLICT_HISTORY and PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX (R2 = 0.32), and the 
second used CONFLICT_HISTORY and ARTISANAL_MINING (R2 = 0.32) (See Table 3.6 and 
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Table 3.7). Both PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX and ARTISANAL_MINING correlate 
strongly with MINING_LEGACY (ρ = 0.64, and 0.67 respectively), suggesting that these three 
variables are capturing much of the same variation as MINING_LEGACY. Yet, these two models 
are less compelling than the model in Table 3.5 due to their slightly lower R2 values, and because 
the independent variables are only significant at the 90% level. Their lower predictive power is 
likely due to the fact that the PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX and ARTISNAL_MINING 
variables are measuring highly contentious issues, but are one step removed from measuring 
conflict itself. Nevertheless, these two models highlight the importance of the variable 
CONFICT_HISTORY as a CONFLICT predictor. For a complete list of all 39 models run for this 
study, their statistically significant variables, and their R2 values, see Table 3.11 in 3.10 
Supplemental Material. 
Table 3.6: Multiple regression for CONFLICT using PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX 
and CONFLICT_HISTORY as independent variables. 











 0.56 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.00 






Confidence Interval 95% 
Regression Table Lower Upper 
Constant 0.36 0.14 2.50 0.02 0.06 0.65 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDE
X -0.30 0.16 -1.91 0.07 -0.63 0.03 
CONFLICT_HISTORY 0.57 0.30 1.90 0.07 -0.06 1.20 
 
Table 3.7: Multiple regression for CONFLICT using ARTISANAL_MINING and 
CONFLICT_HISTORY as independent variables. 












 0.56 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.00 






Confidence Interval 95% 
Regression Table Lower Upper 
Constant 0.30 0.11 2.62 0.02 0.06 0.54 
ARTISANAL_MINING -0.25 0.13 -1.94 0.07 -0.52 0.02 
CONFLICT_HISTORY 0.60 0.30 2.01 0.06 -0.02 1.22 
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3.5.2 Correlations and Statistical Significance 
This study found that conflict history variables and variables that represent a mine’s 
anticipated physical and economic displacement are the best indicators of future company-
stakeholder conflict. This study found only two regression models where an environmental 
variable was a statistically significant indicator of CONFLICT. 
PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA is significant at the 90% confidence level when paired 
with GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK (R2 = 0.29) or when paired with HDI_RANK (R2 = 0.24). These 
results can be compared to social variables like MINING_LEGACY that is significant at the 95% 
confidence level in six models, PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX (95% in four models), 
and ARTISANAL MINING (95% in six models). Some macro-economic variables also 
outperformed environmental variables as indicators of CONLICT. HDI_RANK is significant at 
the 95% confidence level in six models, and GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK is significant at the 95% 
confidence level in four models (and 90% level in two additional models). These findings suggest 
that a property’s environmental impacts are poor indicators of mining company-stakeholder 
conflict, especially compared to that property’s social variables, or even compared to some 
macroeconomic variables that reflect country-wide economic development conditions. 
3.6 Applying the Model: The Case of the Donlin Gold Project 
This section demonstrates how this modeling method can be applied to a particular mining 
property for the purpose of predicting future company-stakeholder conflict. This section applies 
the regression model in Table 3.5 to the Donlin Gold project in Western Alaska. The Donlin Gold 
project is a proposed open pit mine approximately 280 miles west of Anchorage. Donlin Gold, 
LLC, the project’s owner, has proposed to produce one million ounces of gold per year over a 
mine life of 27 years (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018). The company completed their 
Environmental Impact Statement and received a favorable Record of Decision from the Army 
Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Land Management in August 2018. At the time of this research, 
the project was in the advanced permitting stage.  
The presents study’s author worked with Company X to rate Donlin for the variables used 
in this study using the same 0 to 4 rating methodology the company employed in its due diligence 
analysis. These values and their corresponding normalized ranks are shown in  
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Table 3.8. Donlin has news coverage dating back over a decade (11.2 years). Donlin has 
had only one company-stakeholder conflict event in that recorded history. In 2018, around the time 
of the Record of Decision, a group of Alaskan Native tribes filed a lawsuit against the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources and held anti-Donlin marches claiming that they were not 
properly consulted during the Environmental Impact Statement process (Shallenberger, 2018; 
Associated Press, 2019). These values result in a CONFLICT_HISTORY of  0.09.  
Company X’s rating method gave Donlin a rating of 2 for the region’s mining legacy. This 
was because of the property’s relative proximity to the embattled Pebble project located 
approximately 200 miles to the south. Conflict between the Pebble Limited Partnership and local 
stakeholders has made Pebble one of the most controversial mining properties in the world 
(Snyder, 2014). The rating of 2 in the mining legacy category places Donlin in the riskiest third of 
the database by this metric (MINING_LEGACY = 0.33).  
Table 3.8: Data for the Donlin property, Western Alaska. The “Due Diligence Rating / Units” 
column shows the values of the source data. The “Value for the Model” column shows the 








MINING_LEGACY 2 0.33 
HDI_RANK rank of 188 8 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX index 1.00 
CONFLICT_HISTORY events/year 0.09 
ARTISANAL_MINING 4 1.00 
GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK rank of 220 13 
COMMUNITY_RESETTLEMENT 4 1.00 
GOVERNANCE_INDEX index 0.84 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY 3 0.67 
SOCIAL_UNREST 4 1.00 
LAND_OWNERSHIP 3 0.25 
ARD_POTENTIAL 3 0.36 
PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA 2 0.20 
MINERAL_EXPORTS % of exports 0.03 
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX index 0.19 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX index 0.13 




3.6.1 Regression Modeling 
The regression model in Table 3.5 is applied to the Donlin case. This model predicts the 
relationship to future conflict shown in Equation 1: 
[1] CONFLICT = −0.30 ∗ MINING_LEGACY + 0.57 ∗ CONFLICT_HISTORY + 0.31  
When the values for Donlin (MINING_LEGACY = 0.33, and CONFLICT_HISTORY = 
0.09) are applied to this equation, the model predicts a CONFLICT value of 0.26, or an average of 
approximately one conflict every 4 years.  
The 2018 conflict event shows that there is some direct stakeholder opposition to Donlin.  
Employing this model again, the author considers how the prediction would change if 1) the 
conflict had never occurred or 2) if there had been twice as many conflicts in the same period. To 
consider these possibilities the author re-ran the Donlin model using a CONFLICT_HISTORY 
values of 0.00 and 0.18. These values resulted in CONFLICT values of 0.21 and 0.31 conflicts per 
year respectively.  
The model is only explaining about a third of the variation in CONFLICT. Therefore, these 
results should be taken with some caution. However, this model takes an important step toward 
quantifying company-community conflict likelihood and quantitative inputs for subsequent 
decision-making tools. One of these tools is Teschner and Holley’s decision tree model which uses 
conflict likelihood as an input to estimate the impacts of conflict on a mining project’s cash flow 
(Teschner & Holley, 2019). That decision-tree model is explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.7 Interpretations and Conclusions 
This study found that a mining property’s conflict history and the conflict history of other 
properties in the region are the best indicators of mining company-stakeholder conflict. Other 
variables that showed statistically significant relationships to conflict are those that measure the  
mine’s physical displacement of communities and proximity of artisanal mining. For the purposes 
of comparing mining properties’ susceptibility to company-stakeholder conflict, these variables 
are the most useful. 
Environmental variables showed little statistical significance to conflict. This finding is 
initially surprising considering that so many company-stakeholder conflicts seem to center on 
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environmental issues. Yet, further examination of the variables in the database may explain this 
inconsistency.  The environmental variables capture very specific site conditions. 
ARD_POTENTIAL, for example captures whether the rocks in the mine are likely to generate 
acid rock drainage. Similarly, PROXIMITY_TO_PROTECTED_AREA captures the physical 
distance of the mining property from a protected natural space. Neither of these variables capture 
how people feel about these conditions, or if they are comfortable with the company’s plans to 
mitigate the risks. The data contained in these variables do not represent any mitigation measures, 
nor whether stakeholders consider these issues an important concern. Alternatively, this study’s 
high-performing variables like CONFLICT_HISTORY and ARTISANAL_MINING directly 
measure the relationship between the company and stakeholders or how those stakeholders will be 
affected by mining company actions. Underlying these higher performing variables are nuanced 
narratives about people’s relationships to mining, governments, the environment, and each other. 
These stories already include elements of stakeholders’ perspectives and priorities concerning the 
environment as well as how their culture, and economic livelihoods connect to a mine’s 
environmental impacts. 
The specific characteristics of mining’s negative environmental impacts are highly varied 
across mining methods, commodity types, and geographic locations. Even more varied are how 
these environmental impacts affect the unique social and economic conditions around each mining 
property. It is likely that the present study’s database is simply too small to capture this variety 
and level of nuance. Therefore, this study is inconclusive about whether environmental conditions 
may be used as conflict indicators. The findings suggest that evaluators should consider 
environmental conditions within a mining property’s specific socio-economic context, particularly 
how negative environmental conditions might impact local stakeholders economic and livelihood 
activities.  
The locations of communities and the presence of artisanal miners in a country almost 
always predate the arrival of a large-scale mining company. The findings of the present study that 
community resettlement and physical displacement are the strongest indicators of conflict support 
the conclusions of other scholars who found that displacing people and their livelihood activities 
leave stakeholders in a vulnerable position (Owen & Kemp, 2015). Particularly when these 
displacements are involuntary, displaced people may have few options to have their voices heard 
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and advocate for their positions. This study does not include specific data on displacement of 
agriculture or other livelihood activities. However, the importance of all of the livelihood-related 
variables in this database suggests that agriculture displacement may be a good indicator of conflict 
as well. 
The macroeconomic indicators that had strong relationships to conflict suggest that less 
developed countries have higher likelihoods of conflict. Less-developed countries tend to have 
weaker institutions to protect mining stakeholders or incorporate their views into decision-making 
processes. Scholarship on the resource curse suggests that natural resource-dependent countries 
underperform in terms of economic growth (Ross, 1999). Countries with weak institutions are also 
less effective at transforming mining revenues into benefits for these stakeholders (Arellano-
Yanguas, 2011).  These authors suggest that mining stakeholders in less developed countries are 
either more aggrieved by mining than stakeholders in more developed countries; or they have 
fewer non-conflict mechanisms by which to raise their concerns to the company and/or 
government. This finding may also be caused by company-stakeholder conflict leading to poorer 
macroeconomic outcomes for the host countries. Company-stakeholder conflict, especially 
conflicts that result in project delays, could spook potential investors, prompting them to invest in 
other locations.  
This study’s most predictive model included the region’s mining legacy and the conflict 
history at a subject property. It may be tempting for these users to elevate the importance of these 
two variables at the expense of other variables in this study that were poorer performers. The author 
cautions against this oversimplification. Unlike the rest of the variables in this dataset, 
MINING_LEGACY and CONFLICT_HISTORY measure the same conditions as the dependent 
variable, CONFLICT (i.e. instances of conflict). Therefore, these two values already capture a 
complex set of conditions that resulted in conflict or mitigated conflict. Intrinsically embedded in 
each CONFLICT_HISTORY and MINING_LEGACY datum are stories of environmental 
conditions, stakeholders’ livelihoods, politics, mining company (mis)behavior, unique 
personalities, personal relationships, and numerous other factors – all sitting over a 
macroeconomic backdrop. All these factors lead to that property’s particular conflict outcome. The 
fact that this study found that the best indicators of future conflict are the conflicts of the past may 
simply be pointing us toward what we already know: understanding the drivers of any mining 
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company-stakeholder conflict are complex; each country, company, community, and mining 
property is unique; and attempting to generalize their origins should be done with extreme 
humility.  
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3.10 Supplemental Material 
Table 3.9: List of variables, sources, and conversions from categorical data to normalized ranks. A value of NA in the "Units / 
Normalized Rank Conversion" column indicates that the database contains no variables with this value. [1/3 continued on next pages] 
Variable Category Description / Question Source 
Units / Normalized Rank 
Conversion 
Socio-Environmental Variables (Ranked on a 0-4 scale by the company and then converted to normalized ranks for analysis in the present study) 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY Environmental 
Is this project located in sensitive watershed such as in 
municipal water supply?  
 
No - 4; Yes, low-medium risk - 3; Yes, medium-high 
risk - 2; Yes, high risk - 1; Yes, Extreme risk - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No (4):  1.00 
Yes, low-med risk (3): 0.40 
Yes, med-high risk (2): 0.00 
Yes, high risk (1): NA 
Yes, extreme risk (0): NA  
ARD_POTENTIAL Environmental 
Is there ARD [Acid rock drainage] potential? 
 
No - 4; Yes, low-medium risk - 3; Yes, medium-high 
risk - 2; Yes, high risk - 1; Yes, Extreme risk - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No (4):  1.00 
Yes, low-med risk (3): 0.36 
Yes, med-high risk (2): 0.09 
Yes, high risk (1): 0.00 




Is the project located in or near a protected area?   
 
No - 4; Yes, low-medium risk - 3; Yes, medium-high 
risk - 2; Yes, high risk - 1; Yes, Extreme risk - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No (4):  1.00 
Yes, low-med risk (3): 0.60 
Yes, med-high risk (2): 0.20 
Yes, high risk (1): 0.00 
Yes, extreme risk (0): NA 
LAND_OWNERSHIP Social 
Who owns the property? 
 
Company or project - 4; Government or private - 3; 
[Undefined] - 2; Communal - 1; Unclear or 
overlapping tenure - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
Company/Project (4): 1.00 
Government/Private (3): 0.25 
[Undefined] (2): NA 
Communal (1): NA 
Unclear/Overlapping (0): 0.00 
SOCIAL_UNREST Social 
Is there a current or historical presence of social 
conflict or unrest within 2 hours of the project site? 
 
No - 4; Yes, low-medium risk - 3; Yes, medium-high 
risk - 2; Yes, high risk - 1; Yes, Extreme risk - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No (4):  1.00 
Yes, low-med risk (3): 0.27 
Yes, med-high risk (2): 0.09 
Yes, high risk (1): NA 
Yes, extreme risk (0): 0.00 
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Table 3.9 [2/3 continued] 
MINING_LEGACY Social 
Is there a current or historical presence of mining 
activities with a negative legacy/reputation within close 
proximity of the project site?  
 
No - 4; Yes, low-medium risk - 3; Yes, medium-high 
risk - 2; Yes, high risk - 1; Yes, Extreme risk - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No (4):  1.00 
Yes, low-med risk (3): 0.58 
Yes, med-high risk (2): 0.33 
Yes, high risk (1): 0.18 
Yes, extreme risk (0): 0.00 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY Social 
Is there a sense of the level of local government 
capacity? 
 
High capacity - 4; Medium-high capacity - 3; 
[Undefined] - 2; Low-medium capacity - 1; Low 
capacity - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
High capacity (4):  1.00 
Med-high capacity (3): 0.67 
[Undefined] (2): NA 
Low-med capacity (1): 0.58 




Will a resettlement be necessary? 
 
No resettlement required - 4; Fewer than 50 households 
- 3; [Undefined] - 2; Fewer than 100 households - 1; 
More than 100 households - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
No resettlement (4): 1.00 
<50 households (3): 0.25 
[Undefined] (2): NA 
<100 households (1): NA 
>100 households (0): 0.00  
ARTISANAL_MINING Social 
Is there a presence of artisanal and small-scale miners? 
 
Not present - 4; In the country - 3; [Undefined] - 2; 
Within 2-hours - 1; On the property - 0 
Mining company's due 
diligence analysis 
Not present (4): 1.00 
In the country (3): 0.88 
[Undefined] (2): NA 
Within 2-hours: 0.25 




An indicator of local stakeholders’ sensitivity to 
environmental changes. Lower values represent more 
environmentally sensitive stakeholders. 
Compiled from company 
generated variables 





An indicator of the overall environmental conditions at 
the property. Lower values represent higher risk 
environmental conditions from the mining company’s 
perspective. 
Compiled from company 
generated variables 








Table 3.9 [3/3 continued] 
GOVERNANCE_INDEX Social 
An indicator of the overall social and governance 
conditions affecting the property. Lower values 
represent poorer social and governance conditions. 
Compiled from company 
generated variables 
Mean of the 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY, 
and SOCIAL_UNREST 




An indicator of the overall displacement of existing 
activities that the development of a mine would 
require. Lower values represent more displacement. 
Compiled from company 
generated variables 





Conflict Event Variables  
CONFLICT Conflict 
Number of conflicts per year that occurred after the 
property's data of analysis 
Generated from publicly 
available news stories by 
the current study’s author 
Units of Conflicts / Year 
CONFLICT_HISTORY Conflict 
Number of conflicts per year that occurred before the 
property's data of analysis 
Generated from publicly 
available news stories by 
the current study’s author 
Units of Conflicts / Year 
Macroeconomic Variables  
GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK Macro-economic 
The host country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capital rank (of 225 states). Lower values indicate a 
higher GDP per capita. 
World Bank Units of GDP per capita rank 
HDI_RANK Macro-economic 
The host country’s rank on the Human Development 
Index (HDI). Lower values indicate higher levels of 
development. 
World Bank Units of HDI rank 
MINERAL_EXPORTS Macro-economic 
The host country’s mineral exports a share of its total 
exports. Higher values indicate more export 
dependence on mining. 


















GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK 1.00 -0.23 0.99 0.03 -0.33 -0.16 
… 
MINERAL_EXPORTS -0.23 1.00 -0.26 0.24 0.23 0.27 
… 
HDI_RANK 0.99 -0.26 1.00 0.04 -0.32 -0.15 
… 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY 0.03 0.24 0.04 1.00 0.54 0.88 
… 
LAND_OWNERSHIP -0.33 0.23 -0.32 0.54 1.00 0.87 
… 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX -0.16 0.27 -0.15 0.88 0.87 1.00 
… 
ARD_POTENTIAL -0.01 0.42 -0.01 0.47 0.34 0.46 
… 
PROXIMITY_TO 
_PROTECTED_AREA -0.17 0.24 -0.15 0.23 0.63 0.49 
… 
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX -0.06 0.40 -0.05 0.78 0.70 0.84 
… 
SOCIAL_UNREST -0.69 0.17 -0.68 0.04 0.27 0.17 
… 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY -0.87 0.03 -0.88 -0.10 0.11 0.00 
… 
GOVERANCE_INDEX -0.88 0.11 -0.88 -0.04 0.21 0.10 
… 
COMMUNITY 
_RESETTLEMENT -0.62 0.33 -0.62 0.16 0.47 0.35 
… 
ARTISANAL_MINING -0.80 0.40 -0.85 0.00 0.28 0.16 
… 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX -0.78 0.40 -0.81 0.08 0.40 0.27 
… 
MINING_LEGACY -0.61 -0.02 -0.66 0.24 0.41 0.37 
… 






Table 3.10 [2/3 continued] 







_CAPACITY   
GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK … -0.01 -0.17 -0.06 -0.69 -0.87 … 
MINERAL_EXPORTS … 0.42 0.24 0.40 0.17 0.03 … 
HDI_RANK … -0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.68 -0.88 … 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY … 0.47 0.23 0.78 0.04 -0.10 … 
LAND_OWNERSHIP … 0.34 0.63 0.70 0.27 0.11 … 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX … 0.46 0.49 0.84 0.17 0.00 … 
ARD_POTENTIAL … 1.00 0.38 0.75 0.24 -0.16 … 
PROXIMITY_TO 
_PROTECTED_AREA … 0.38 1.00 0.72 0.27 -0.11 … 
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX … 0.75 0.72 1.00 0.23 -0.15 … 
SOCIAL_UNREST … 0.24 0.27 0.23 1.00 0.54 … 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY … -0.16 -0.11 -0.15 0.54 1.00 … 
GOVERANCE_INDEX … 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.87 0.89 … 
COMMUNITY 
_RESETTLEMENT … 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.50 0.30 … 
ARTISANAL_MINING … 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.52 0.64 … 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX … 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.55 0.53 … 
MINING_LEGACY … 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.59 0.55 … 
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GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK … -0.88 -0.62 -0.80 -0.78 -0.61 0.37 
MINERAL_EXPORTS … 0.11 0.33 0.40 0.40 -0.02 -0.15 
HDI_RANK … -0.88 -0.62 -0.85 -0.81 -0.66 0.34 
WATERSHED_SENSITIVITY … -0.04 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.24 -0.28 
LAND_OWNERSHIP … 0.21 0.47 0.28 0.40 0.41 -0.11 
LAND_&_WATER_INDEX … 0.10 0.35 0.16 0.27 0.37 -0.22 
ARD_POTENTIAL … 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.16 -0.14 
PROXIMITY_TO 
_PROTECTED_AREA … 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.26 
ENVIRONMENTAL_INDEX … 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.16 0.26 -0.06 
SOCIAL_UNREST … 0.87 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.59 -0.26 
GOVERNMENT_CAPACITY … 0.89 0.30 0.64 0.53 0.55 -0.45 
GOVERANCE_INDEX … 1.00 0.45 0.66 0.62 0.65 -0.41 
COMMUNITY 
_RESETTLEMENT … 0.45 1.00 0.68 0.90 0.49 -0.23 
ARTISANAL_MINING … 0.66 0.68 1.00 0.93 0.67 -0.17 
PHYSICAL_DISPLACEMENT_INDEX … 0.62 0.90 0.93 1.00 0.64 -0.22 
MINING_LEGACY … 0.65 0.49 0.67 0.64 1.00 -0.20 






Table 3.11: Table of regressions run for this study. Values in parentheses indicate the model's R2 
value. ** indicates that the variable is significant at the 95% level. *indicates that the variable is 
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Table 3.11 [2/2 continued] 
REGRESSION SERIES 
 
CONFLICT_HISTORY ARTISANAL_MINING GDP_PER_CAPITA_RANK 
MINING_LEGACY 
       
HDI_RANK 
       
PHYSICAL 
_DISPLACEMENT 
_INDEX        
CONFLICT_HISTORY 
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CHAPTER 4: THE COST OF MINE SUSPENSION FROM SOCIAL CONFLICT: A DECISION-
TREE MODEL 
A paper published in the Journal Resources Policy1 
Benjamin Teschner2,3, and Elizabeth Holley 
4.1 Abstract 
This paper presents a method which incorporates the risk associated with project suspension from 
social conflict into a mining project’s net present value (NPV). The model applies a series of 
decision trees to a project’s discounted cash flow (DCF) allowing for the chance of project 
suspension from a company-community conflict event. The model determines a social-risk-
adjusted NPV for the project based on the likelihood of project suspension and the potential loss 
of future opportunity. This paper applies the model to a generic mining cash flow using two 
different approaches to estimating the project’s likelihood of suspension and compares the efficacy 
of each method. The paper then applies the model to the proposed Pebble Project in Southwestern 
Alaska. The work concludes that after the risks associated with stakeholder opposition are 
accounted for, the NPV of the Pebble Project drops from approximately $6 billion to $1.1 billion. 
The model translates stakeholder concerns and priorities into potential financial consequences for 
investors, thereby demonstrating the business case for incorporating stakeholder positions into 
mine design and planning. 
4.2 Introduction 
Social conflicts between mining companies and stakeholders increasingly account for 
delay or complete stoppage of mining projects, and lasting frustrations in stakeholder communities 
(Okoh, 2014; Woods, 2014; Jamasmie, 2015). In the late 1990s, many mining companies began to 
recognize that stakeholders had the ability to grant or withhold a mining project’s social license to 
 
1
 Reprinted with permission from Resources Policy 2019 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.101443 
2 Primary researcher and corresponding author 
3 Department of Mining Engineering, Colorado School of Mines, 1500 Illinois Street, Golden, 
CO, 80401, USA 
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operate (SLO) (Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). Since then, the industry has increasingly focused on 
the effects of mining development on local communities and the role stakeholders play in defining 
the success or failure of a mining venture (Humphreys, 2000; Cambell & Roberts, 2010; 
Dashwood, 2012; Prno, 2013). The SLO is so critical that some mining companies and 
consultancies report that social and “above ground” risks vastly outweigh technical risks to mining 
projects (Rio Tinto, 2011; Environmental Resources Management, 2016; Upton, 2016; Mitchell, 
2019). These conditions necessitate the development of new approaches that incorporate the social 
conditions of a mine site into the mine planning and valuation process. 
This paper presents a decision-tree model which translates stakeholders’ concerns and 
priorities into an estimate of monetary risk to the investors. The model incorporates the risk 
associated with project suspension from social conflict into a mining project’s valuation. The 
model considers the possibility that stakeholders may revoke the company’s SLO at any stage of 
the mining lifecycle. The model then applies a series of decision trees to the project’s cash flow to 
translate this possibility into financial risk. The method determines a social conflict risk-adjusted 
net present value (NPV) for the project based on the likelihood of forced social conflict-induced 
project suspension and the potential loss of future opportunity for the investor.  
By accounting for the potential financial consequences of developing a mining venture in 
a confrontational or community-inclusive environment, the model highlights the importance of 
stakeholders’ priorities and perspectives in determining a mining venture’s success or failure. At 
the project level, an investor can employ this model to determine: the risk-neutral cost of 
suspension from social conflict; the risk neutral value and timing of conflict within project stages 
(exploration, feasibility, construction, operation, and closure); and, if applied to multiple projects, 
the value and timing of social risk across the investment portfolio.  
Although this model does not inform a company or stakeholders how to manage social 
risks at a mining property, the results can be used to inform a development decision and, should 
the project move forward, the results can be used to plan investment in stakeholder engagement 
programs. The current prevailing approach to social risk management in the mining industry is 
corporate social responsibility (CSR); social and environmental efforts that move beyond the 
standards of legal compliance (Dashwood, 2012). Other scholars have connected CSR to an 
“insurance effect” on a company’s share price when they experience negative legal or regulator 
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actions (Godfrey, et al., 2009). The model proposed in this paper suggests that financial value at 
the project-level can be similarly improved by reducing the chance of company-community 
conflict; for example, by employing stakeholder engagement programs and beyond-compliance 
efforts which address stakeholders’ concerns.  
The relationship between a company and stakeholders develops early in the project 
lifecycle when stakeholders begin to assess the legitimacy of the company and potential acceptance 
of the mining project (Boutelier & Thomson, 2011; Thomson & Boutilier, 2011). Accordingly, 
guidance documents from organizations including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
(2007), and International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) (2012) recommend that 
companies and stakeholders pursue meaningful engagement early in the project. The model 
proposed in this paper quantitatively demonstrates the impact of stakeholder influence early in the 
mining lifecycle, providing project-level justification for these recommendations.  
4.2.1 Accounting for Social Risks 
The mining industry’s current convention to accounting for increased social risk is to apply 
a higher development ‘hurdle rate’ to a project, thereby increasing the predicted profitability 
required to trigger development (Davis, 2001; Perrott-Humphrey, 2011, p. 70). Even if the risk 
could be accurately captured in the hurdle rate increase, this approach relies on two assumptions: 
The first is that social risks behave incrementally (i.e., that the risk may result in increased costs 
or decreased revenue by a certain percentage, but does not terminate the project outright); and the 
second assumption is that the risk is constant over the life of the project. Scholars have questioned 
both of these assumptions when analyzing social and other non-technical risks in mining projects 
(Cambell & Roberts, 2010; Trench, et al., 2014). 
Economic scholars have long recognized the inadequacies of the traditional discounted 
cash flow (DCF) approach for under- or over-valued projects when compared to the project’s risks 
(Black & Scholes, 1973; Gentry & O'Neil, 1984; Dixit, 2001; Schwartz & Trigeorgis, 2001). From 
the perspective of the model in this paper, the most pertinent alternative to DCF method is 
Espinoza and Morris’s (2013) approach which decouples the discount rate from the project risks 
by accounting for risk as an annual insurance cost, a method they called decoupled net present 
value (DNPV). Espinoza and Rojo (2015) later showed how this method can be applied to the 
valuation of solar energy project, and Shimbar and Ebrahimi (2017) used it in their analysis of an 
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oil and gas investment. As exemplified by these applied examples, the DNPV approach relies 
heavily on the ability to quantify a risk in dollar values either by having an insurance market for 
the risk, or by connecting these risks directly to particular public policy changes that would affect 
the revenues and/or costs to the investment.  
Perhaps the most widely cited study on the cost of social conflict in mining is the work of 
Davis and Franks (2014) who determined that social conflict cost a large mine $20 million per 
week. This estimate stresses the importance and scale of mining’s social risks, but is too granular 
to inform decisions at an individual mine or project. Conversely, the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Financial Valuation Tool (commonly called the FV Tool) attempts to use site-
specific criteria but relies on a subjective assessment of both social risks and the potential effects 
of mitigation activities (International Finance Corporation, 2017). For example, the tool asks the 
user to input an individual risk such as “lawsuits” and quantify the potential costs of the risk’s 
outcome, as well as the individual’s perception of the company’s ability to control the risk’s 
outcomes in a percentage. The tool is overly reliant on the company’s perception of what 
stakeholders value and their own effectiveness at CSR programs in order to quantify their social 
investments (Lukic, et al., 2011). 
The method presented in this paper aims to make the accounting of social risk less 
subjective by incorporating quantitative likelihoods of conflict-induced suspension4. The approach 
presented in this paper allows technical experts to examine the factors that may contribute to a 
project’s suspension without being forced to consider the financial effects at the same time. This 
method allows these experts to employ the tools that they have already developed to determine 
levels of community acceptance (Prno, 2013; Que & Awuah-Offei, 2014), and then apply these to 
predict their financial effects on the future of the project. 
4.3 Structure of the Model 
A conventional DCF model assumes that a mine will operate continuously from the start 
of construction through its designed mine life and into closure. The traditional approach predicts 
 
4 This model does not account for the costs associated with shorter-term delays from company-
community conflict. These types of delays are beyond the scope of this model but can also 
represent significant costs to investors. 
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a single NPV for the project based on that designed life. The model proposed here builds upon the 
DCF model by recognizing that operating through the entire mine life is not a given, but that there 
is a chance in any year that stakeholders could choose to revoke the company’s social license to 
operate and force the mine’s suspension. Therefore, instead of limiting the model to a single end-
of-mine-life NPV, the model calculates a unique NPV for a scenario in which that year is the end 
of the mine’s life. Each value represents a possible outcome that the cash flow is interrupted prior 
to its designed completion, rendering any future investment and/or return impossible. The model 
calculates the risk cost of these possible premature suspensions based on the likelihood of each 
outcome and the corresponding loss of future opportunity. This cost can be subtracted from the 
DCF-determined NPV to determine a social-risk adjusted NPV for the project as a whole. 
 4.3.1 Model Assumptions 
The model assumes that if a project is suspended, no more money needs to be spent, and 
no additional revenues can be recovered. This means that costs associated with closure should be 
captured in the DCF model as a development cost (such as the posting of a reclamation bond). It 
also means that the costs associated with abandonment of a project are assumed to be zero, and 
that if the project had to be suspended, it has no remaining value in salvage or as a saleable asset. 
If these values are not zero, then they should be added to the model in each year’s decision value. 
This paper adheres to mining industry convention with respect to the notation of project 
years. Year one (Y1) is defined as the first year of production. Prior years included in the model 
are expressed as values less than one. For example, construction may be Y0 and feasibility Y-1. 
These numeric values are used in the example cash flow in section 3.0 and the application of the 
model to the Pebble Project in section 4.0. In the generic case described in section 2.2, the paper 
uses YA and YZ as the first and last year of analysis, respectively. This generic notation intends to 
highlight that the modeler may begin and end an analysis at any point in the project lifecycle, from 
exploration through the final years of production. 
 4.3.2 Model Formulation 
The model calculates a series of NPV values for each project year defined by equation 1, 
where Vx is the NPV of the mine if it was forced to suspend at the end of year x, ƒNPV is the NPV 
function (discounted at the cost of capital) and Cx is the cash flow for year x in units of currency. 
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The model stores these possible project outcome values as results if the venture was forced to 
suspend at the end of year x. These values assume that all costs for that year have been spent and 
all revenues for that year have been recovered at the moment of suspension.  
[1] 𝑉𝑥 = ƒ𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝐴, … 𝐶−1, 𝐶0, 𝐶1, … 𝐶𝑍) 
The model constructs a decision tree from the project’s cash flow. In each year, the project 
may suspend or continue operations (Figure 4.1). When a venture reaches each project year, the 
chance that a social conflict event will force it to suspend in that year is defined as Px. The social 
conflict risk-adjusted value of the project at any point is therefore the weighted average of all 
future project outcomes. 
 
Figure 4.1: Decision tree for the proposed model showing the project’s possible outcomes (V) and 
the risk-adjusted project value at each decision point (weighted average of all future V values). 
Each column represents a project year (Y). 
 
The likelihood that the project advances through project year x (defined as Qx) is the 
product of the likelihood of the venture reaching that project year, and the likelihood that it will 
not be suspended in that year. These values can be calculated using Equation 2. The likelihood that 
the project reaches its full designed life (QZ) is calculated using Equation 3. As the project 
advances through time, past decision points are removed from the calculation and the Qx values 
increase accordingly. 
[2] 𝑄𝑥 =  𝑄𝑥−1(1 − 𝑃𝑥) 
[3] 𝑄𝑍 = 1 − ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑍−1𝑖 = 𝐴  
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Using these values, the modeler can calculate the likelihood that an operation would be 
suspended in a given future year (Sx) by taking the product of the likelihood that a project reaches 
that year, and the likelihood that it will be suspended in that same year (Equation 4). Therefore, 
the sum of all Sx values represents the likelihood that the project will be forced into suspension 
due to social conflict at some point during the period of analysis. 
[4] 𝑆𝑥 =  𝑄𝑥𝑃𝑥 
With these values, the model calculates the risk associated with social-conflict-induced 
suspension. In any given year x, the social-conflict-suspension risk (Rx) is defined as the amount 
of risk that is reduced by the project advancing from year x to year x+1 (Equation 5). The sum of 
all future Rx values (Rtotal) represents the total social-conflict-induced-suspension risk in the project 
(Equation 6). This Rtotal value can be thought of as the ‘risk cost’ associated with the social conflict 
conditions at the project. It is equivalent to the conventional, DCF NPV (or Vz) less the social 
conflict risk-adjusted NPV. 
[5] 𝑅𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑍𝑖=𝑥+1 𝑆𝑖∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑍𝑖=𝑥+1 −  ∑ 𝑉𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑍𝑖=𝑥∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑍𝑖=𝑥  
[6] 𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑍𝑖=𝐴  
4.4 Application to a Simplified Case 
This section applies the model to a simplified project cash flow shown in Table 4.1. This 
cash flow supposes a mining venture that has recently completed its pre-feasibility analysis; 
investors are considering whether to advance the project further. The pre-feasibility study 
estimates that a complete feasibility study and permitting would cost $25 million, and construction 
costs would be $300 million. The mine would have a six-year life with net revenue of $100 million 
in each year of production. The study’s conventional DCF analysis determines that the property 






Table 4.1: Generic project model showing cash flow (Cx) values and associated NPV outcomes 
(Vx) for each project year (Yx). The Vx values are undiscounted for the purposes of illustrating the 
model’s effects.  
Year: (Y) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Stage: Feas Cons Oper Oper Oper Oper Oper Oper 
Cash Flow: Cx ($25) ($300) $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 
NPV if Suspended: Vx ($25) ($325) ($225) ($125) ($25) $75 $175 $275 
 
The obvious challenge with this modeling method is assigning values for Px. Similar to 
Espinoza and Morris’s (2013) decoupled NPV approach, the method proposed in this paper 
requires that the estimation of critical risk-quantifying parameters (Px and its subsets) be done by 
technical experts in the socio-economic factors of mining projects. Clearly, there is substantial 
opportunity for additional research on the methods of transforming easily measurable project 
variables into conflict and project-suspension likelihoods. These challenges notwithstanding, a 
strength of this model is that places the expertise of the social specialists alongside that of 
engineers, geologists, metallurgists, and other technical professionals whose calculations and 
assumptions have long formed the foundation for a mining project’s valuation.  
The following sections discuss two potential approaches for estimating Px, the literature 
supporting these different approaches, and application of each approach to the simplified project 
model. 
 4.4.1 Approach 1: Suspension Likelihood as a Function of Project Stage 
Previous studies suggest that company-community conflict risks are significantly higher in 
the early stages of a mining venture, particularly during the feasibility (including permitting), and 
construction stages (Davis & Franks, 2014; International Finance Corporation, 2014; Trench, et 
al., 2014). These studies suggest that Px values should be higher during feasibility and construction 
than they are during operations. Davis and Franks (2014) provide some clues to the relative 
magnitude of these changes in their study on the cost associated with company-community 
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conflict. Their work examined 50 cases of prolonged company-community conflict5 and noted 
both the mines’ stage and whether the company had been forced to suspend or abandon mining-
related activities due to the social conflict (See Table 4.2).  
The suspension likelihood is probably higher at the early stages because these the most 
physical change occurs in these periods, and stakeholders have the greatest number of formal 
mechanisms to challenge a company’s plans to develop the mine. Qualitative studies show some 
examples of these mechanisms. At the Polymet project in Minnesota, stakeholders sued the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and the state’s Department of Natural Resources challenging their 
environmental impact conclusions during the project’s feasibility and permitting stage 
(Karnowski, 2018; Phadke, 2018). At Minas Conga in Peru, the materialization of environmental 
impacts during the construction stage resulted in community protests, forcing Newmont to suspend 
construction activities (Woods, 2014, pp. 654-680).  
Trench et al. (2014) observe that unlike technical risks, which gradually decrease over the 
life of the mine, non-technical risks are relatively low in exploration, spike in feasibility and 
construction, then steadily decline as the project moves to production. Pierre Lassonde, former 
CEO of Newmont, noted a precipitous drop in junior companies’ share prices as their project 
advances to feasibility. He attributed this drop to the notion that the feasibility study frequently 
sheds light on the project’s specific risks and complications – noting that “reality sets in” 
(Lassonde, 1994). Although Lassonde did not specifically identify social risk, many of the 
complications modern feasibility studies identify fall into this category. Lassonde observes that 
the company’s value does not fully recover until production, when the project has shown it can 
overcome its unique challenges.  
 
5 Davis and Franks’ ‘prolonged conflicts’ are not rigidly defined, but include least one of the 
following types of activities when conducted with the goal of disrupting mining activities: 
Procedural conflict (litigation, formal complaints to administrative bodies, or negative publicity 
through international non-governmental organizations); physical protest (marches, strikes, or 
blockades); violence to property (private or publicly owned); and/or violence to persons (resulting 




Figure 4.2: The “Lassonde Curve” showing a generalized plot of a junior mining company's share 
price over time. All the annotations in the original figure, with the exception of the "Feasibility 
Study Starts" box which was added per Lassonde's discussion of the figure in the text (Lassonde, 
1994, p. 134). 
Table 4.2: Chances of suspension or abandonment of a mining property if a major company-
community conflict event occurs. The statistics are adapted from Davis and Franks (2014) showing 
the number of cases (n) they examined in each stage and the percent of conflicts in that stage that 
resulted in suspension. Davis and Franks identify two different forced-stoppage outcomes they call 
‘suspension’ and ‘abandonment.’ For the purposes of the work in this paper these two outcomes 
have been combined and labeled ‘suspension.’ 
Mining Stage When A Major Conflict Occurs 
Result of Conflict 
Not Suspended Suspended (Ps) 
Exploration (n = 3) 67% 33% 
Feasibility & Pre-Feasibility (n = 9) 22% 78% 
Construction (n = 9) 56% 44% 
Operations (n = 23) 91% 9% 
Expansion (n = 5) 80% 20% 
Closure (n = 1) 100% 0% 
 
If the modeler accepts the relatively high suspension likelihoods in the early stages, Davis 
and Franks’ numbers comprise one half of the Px value. Because Davis and Franks only examined 
cases where company-community conflict was occurring, their values represent the likelihood of 



























the Px value, the modeler must determine the likelihood that conflict will occur in the first place 
(Pc) and take the product of the two sub-variables to determine Px (See Equation 7). A modeler 
may determine a Pc value for their case by examining the conflict history of the site in question. If 
there is little data or only a short project history, the modeler may examine the conflict histories 
from other mines and projects in the region to estimate this value.  
 [7] 𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑐𝑃𝑠 
Using this approach, the modeler can then apply a uniform Pc value across the project life 
to account for the project’s specific social risk environment. Since conflict events between 
companies and communities are significantly more frequent than outright suspensions 
(International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015), this approach has the added advantage that 
representative Pc data for the subject site may be easier to obtain. Indeed, company-community 
conflict events are usually considered “material information” with respect to the mining 
company’s valuation on major stock exchanges, so these events are typically recorded in the 
company’s public records. Alternatively, local and international media outlets commonly report 
company-community conflicts, providing another record of the quantity and timing of conflict 
events. Determining a useful Pc value may be as simple as adding up these events and dividing by 
the period of time analyzed. 
Figure 4.3 shows the risk by project year for Pc values of 0.045, 0.225, and 0.450. These 
values correspond to average Px values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 respectively over the life of the 
example project. The risk in feasibility is lower than construction because the opportunities for 
losses are relatively low, even though the likelihood of suspension is relatively high. If the project 
is forced into suspension during feasibility, the investors only lose the relatively small investment 
that they made in the feasibility study. However, once the project proceeds to construction, the 
mine’s development costs are sunk, and the only means of recovering these costs are through the 
future production of the mine. Even though the likelihood of suspension during construction is 
about half that of feasibility, the consequences of losing the enormous construction investment 




Figure 4.3: Risk cost by stage for Px values calculated using Ps values from Davis and Frank’s 
(2014) project-suspensions by stage statistics (shown in Table 4.2). Pc values were chosen such 
that the mean Px value (Px-ave) for each iteration corresponds with those in Figure 4.4 
4.4.2 Approach 2: Uniform Suspension Likelihood 
Davis and Franks’ statistics on conflict-induced suspensions by stage represent a relatively 
small number of cases, and their report cautions that their “case analysis does not purport to reflect 
the circumstances of the entire extractive sector” (Davis & Franks, 2014, p. 16). Therefore, there 
may be situations in which application of a uniform Px value over the project’s life is more 
appropriate than the stage-dependent Px presented in Approach 1. A uniform Px value is especially 
appropriate if the period of analysis represents only a single project stage (such as operations) 
where year-to-year conditions and social impacts are relatively consistent. To apply this approach, 
the modeler must generate Px from quantification of social-conflict-induced suspensions at other 
similar properties.  
Figure 4.4 shows the risk by project year for Px values of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. Note that 
compared to the stage-dependent Px approach, this method returns lower risk values in feasibility 
and construction, but maintains relatively high risk as the project moves to operations. These 
conditions result in a more aggressive valuation (NPV is higher) because it reduces the magnitude 
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of the risk spike associated with investment in construction. Despite the constant likelihood of 
suspension, the risk still increases significantly for all Px values when the project moves from 
feasibility to construction due to the sudden injection of sunk capital costs.  
 
Figure 4.4: Risk cost by stage for Px values of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. For this approach, a uniform Px 
is selected for the entire life of the venture. 
 4.4.3 Cases of Extreme Px Values 
The examples shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 demonstrate that risks in all stages 
increase as the likelihood of suspension increases. However, this condition only holds true in cases 
of low to moderate suspension likelihood (Px) values. In cases of extremely high Px values, the 
model produces a unique condition with respect to the feasibility stage (regardless of which 
approach the modeler takes to estimating Px). The risk in a given year is defined as the amount that 
the total project risk decreases by advancing the project through that year. As Px increases for a 
given project, the amount of risk in feasibility reaches a peak and then begins to decline, eventually 
becoming negative for cases of extremely high Px (See Figure 4.5). The model suggests that in 
cases where company-community conflict potential is exceptionally high as indicated by 
feasibility risk becoming negative, the total project risk can increase by advancing the project. The 
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reason for this oddity is that the high Px creates positive value in feasibility by allowing the project 
the opportunity to suspend when consequences are relatively low, so that the project never reaches 
the very high risk construction stage when the consequences of suspension would be extremely 
high.  
 
Figure 4.5: Risk in feasibility and construction stages for the uniform Px example case. Note that 
the risk in construction increases as Px increases. The risk in feasibility reaches a peak at an 
approximate Px value of 0.10 and then becomes negative for Px values of 0.20 and greater. 
 
In the extremely high risk cases (Px values on the right side of Figure 4.5), the model 
suggests that the risk-averse investor should exit the project prior to construction, even if that exit 
comes at a cost, because the risk-adjusted NPV will be lower if such a socially controversial project 
moves ahead. One example of a company paying to exit a highly controversial project is the Mount 
Emmons Project, near Crested Butte, Colorado. In 2013, U.S. Energy initiated the permitting 
process for a plan to mine 17-20 million pounds of molybdenum per year for 33 years (CNBC, 
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2013). Local stakeholders had opposed mining activities at Mount Emmons since the 1970s 
arguing that mine development conflicts with the outdoor recreation and tourism activities that 
drive the local economy (Blevins, 2016). Freeport McMoRan took over the property in 2016. Only 
three years after the permitting process was initiated, the company signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the U.S. Forest Service and local and state governments agreeing to cease 
mineral exploration and mine development activities at the property and pay $2 million for the 
continued operation of a facility that treats acidic water from historic mine workings (Crested Butte 
News, 2016). Mount Emmons had been called “the longest running mine battle in the West” 
(Blevins, 2016) and the likelihood of continued stakeholder opposition was extremely high. 
Therefore, exiting the project at the cost of $2 million was preferable to attempting to advance 
such a controversial mining venture any further. 
4.5 Application of the Model to the Pebble Project, Southwest Alaska 
This section applies the model to the Pebble Project in Southwestern Alaska, using the 
stage-dependent Px estimation approach. Pebble is a large porphyry copper-gold-molybdenum 
deposit at the headwaters of the Bristol Bay salmon fishery, about 200 miles southwest of 
Anchorage. Stakeholders have been concerned about the proposed mine’s environmental effects 
on the downstream salmon fishery and whether this risk is worth the potential economic benefits 
to the community (Holley & Mitcham, 2016). From 2007 to 2013, the project was under 
consideration for development by the Pebble Limited Partnership, a 50:50 partnership between the 
Canadian junior company Northern Dynasty Minerals Limited, and the major mining company 
Anglo American PLC. The project’s 2011 feasibility study proposed a 45-year mine life, in which 
an average of 84 million tons of ore would be processed per year. Using the company’s projections 
of long-term metal prices and a discount rate of 7%, the feasibility study concluded that the project 
had a pre-tax NPV of about $6 billion and an IRR of 14% (Northern Dynasty Minerals, 2011). At 
the time of the present study, the project remains undeveloped.   
The model constructed here uses only data that would have been known to the market at 
the time that the 2011 feasibility study was released, including the projected cash flow from that 
study, and company-community conflict events that occurred in 2011 or prior. All of the data used 
in the present analysis were reported in the public realm. The model uses Northern Dynasty 
Minerals’ projected cash flows from the 2011 study to calculate Vx values. For this case study, the 
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model uses the company’s “45-year Reference Case” cash flow, which is the more conservative 
of the two 45-year cases they offer in the report. The model returns similar results for the 
company’s more project-favorable “Prevailing Metal Prices” cash flow, so these results are not 
shown.  
To simplify the case slightly, the model only analyzes the first ten years of the project life: 
four years of construction activities, and the first six years of production. The model assumes that 
if the mine reaches production year six (Y6) without being suspended, then it will complete its 
designed 45-year life. This simplification allows the modeler to avoid over-extrapolating the Px 
values generated from data in the early 2000s into the 2040s or beyond. The simplification 
therefore accepts the diminishing influence of distant discounted cash flows.  
 4.5.1 Estimating Pc 
The model applies the stage-dependent approach to Px, using Davis and Franks’ statistics 
for Ps and an estimated Pc value of 0.38. In order to estimate Pc, major conflict events were 
identified in news archives from the Anchorage Daily News, which is a major newspaper in 
Alaska. The newspaper began covering the Pebble Project consistently in 2004 when Northern 
Dynasty announced that it would be advancing the project to the feasibility stage. Based on the 
newspaper articles published on the project from 2004 through 2011 (the year the feasibility study 
was completed), the modelers identified three distinct stakeholder-led efforts to halt the Pebble 
Project (Table 4.3). The events shown in Table 4.3 fall into Davis and Frank’s category of 
procedural conflict, specifically: litigation, and formal complaints to administrative bodies. 
Discretion is required when deciding which events should be counted as significant and how 
different sub-events should be grouped. In this case, the Pc of 0.38 was calculated by dividing three 









Table 4.3: Major company-community conflict events at the Pebble Project from 2004 to 2011. 
Conflict Event Description Time Period 
Statewide Ballot 
Measure 4 
Bristol Bay residents successfully petitioned 
for a state-wide ballot measure increasing the 
standards that new large-scale mines must 
meet when discharging water into potential 
drinking water sources and salmon habitat. 
The measure was defeated by state-wide 
voters (Bluemink, 2007; 2008a; 2008b). 
The petition for the ballot measure 
was submitted in Juneau in April 
2007 and Alaskans voted on the 
initiative in November 2008.  A 
number of sub-events associated 
with the measure occurred 




Nine Alaskan Native Village Corporations 
sued the state of Alaska claiming that the 
Department of Natural Resources had issued 
exploration permits at Pebble without 
properly seeking public input.  State judges 
eventually ruled against the Native 
Corporations (Bluemink, 2009; 2010). 
The suit was filed in July 2009 and 






Residents of Alaska’s Lake and Peninsula 
Borough voted 280-246 to disallow permits 
for any mining activity that would have 
‘significant impacts’ on salmon habitat. The 
state courts later voided the law on the 
grounds that the state legislature, not local 
boroughs, has authority over mineral 
resources (Cockerham, 2011).  
The initiative passed on a vote in 
October 2011. Legal challenges 
had been filed by the Pebble 
Partnership earlier in 20111. 
* The law was struck down in 2014 (Demer, 2014), which is outside the time period analyzed in 
the present study. Even though the result would not have been know during 2011, the effort to pass 
the intiative would have been know. The effort is what constitues the conflict event, not the result, 
so the event should be included in the Pc calculations.  
 4.5.2. Adjusted Valuation for the Pebble Project 
Using Px values estimated by combining Davis and Franks’ statistics with the project 
history analysis, the model determines a social conflict risk-adjusted NPV of $1.1 billion for 
Pebble, which is about $4.8 billion dollars less than the traditionally-determined valuation (See  
 
Table 4.4 4.4). The model shows that the highest risk years are during the four years of 
construction, reaching a peak in the final year of construction (Y-1). At that point, investors have 
sunk $4.6 billion into the project, have not yet seen any returns on that investment, and there 





Table 4.4: Risk-Adjusted valuation of the Pebble Project accounting for stakeholder opposition to 
the mine. The valuation represents an analysis of data that would have been available to the market 
at the time of Northern Dynasty’s 2011 feasibility study. 
Year -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6-45 
Stage Cons Cons Cons Cons Oper Oper Oper Oper Oper Oper 
Cx: Cash Flow 
(Billions) 
-$1.00 -$1.00 -$1.10 -$1.50 $0.20 $0.90 $1.00 $0.90 $0.80 $55.10 
Vx: NPV@7%  if 
suspended 
(Billions) 
-$0.93 -$1.81 -$2.71 -$3.85 -$3.71 -$3.11 -$2.49 -$1.96 -$1.53 $5.88 
Ps: Chance of 
suspension if a 
conflict occurs 
0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Pc: Chance of 
conflict 
0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Px: Chance of 
suspension from 
social conflict 
0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Rx: Risk in 
Project Year 
(Billions) 
$0.41 $0.66 $0.97 $1.39 $0.29 $0.28 $0.27 $0.26 $0.25 $0.00 







The social conditions that were present at the Pebble Project at the time of the 2011 
feasibility study represented a substantial risk to the project’s future profitability, as indicated by 
the risk-adjusted valuation presented here. Since then, the Pebble Project has seen continued 
opposition from stakeholders including: marches (Demer, 2013; DeMarban, 2018a), preemptive 
boycotts of the mine’s products by major jewelers (Bluemink, 2008d; Associated Press, 2009), 
and another state-wide ballot initiative aimed at stopping the project (DeMarban, 2018b). There is 
some indication that Northern Dynasty recognized the threat that this social opposition posed as 
early as 2008 when they began a larger public relations effort and established a fund to support 
community development in Bristol Bay. Despite these attempts to improve the project’s public 
image (Bluemink, 2008c), strong stakeholder opposition to the project persisted. 
In 2013, after investing over half a billion dollars into Pebble over the previous six years, 
mining giant Anglo American withdrew from their partnership with Northern Dynasty, citing that 
they preferred to focus their investments on projects with “lowest risks” (Cockerham, 2013). After 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received “multiple inquiries, concerns, and 
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petitions” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014) from project stakeholders, the Obama-
era agency embarked on a study which concluded that development of the Pebble Mine would 
“jeopardize the long-term health and sustainability of the Bristol Bay ecosystem” pursuant to the 
Clean Water Act (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014). The EPA affirmed its decision 
under the subsequent Trump administration, which restricts the likelihood of mine development at 
Pebble (Eilperin & Dennis, 2018). 
 
Figure 4.6: Social conflict risk for the first ten years of the Pebble Project. The model shows that 
the value of the project is $4.8 billion lower than traditional DCF methods, resulting in a risk-
adjusted NPV of $1.1 billion. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The decision-tree valuation model presented in this paper provides a tool for a modeler to 
capture the impact of stakeholders in a mining project valuation. The model allows stakeholders’ 
perspectives to be considered alongside the other variables that inform a mining development 
decision. Using these numbers, an investor can make a more informed decision on whether a 
mining project should move forward, and if so, how and when design alternatives and community 
engagement programs could be employed to minimize company-community conflict and increase 
the project’s value. 
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This approach calls on investors to look critically at mining projects where there is social 
opposition. As is demonstrated in the Pebble case study, major stakeholder concerns increases the 
likelihood that investors will be forced to walk away from a project prior to receiving a return on 
their investment. In cases where stakeholders actively oppose the venture, this opposition can 
represent a substantial risk to the project that can be quantified in the erosion of billions of dollars 
in project value. In case of extreme conflict, investors may even increase the project’s overall risk 
by advancing it beyond feasibility. 
4.7 Acknowledgments 
Thanks to Dr. John Grubb, Dr. Ian Lange, Lukas Fahle, and Marion Nicco who provided 
helpful discussion and support during this work.  
96 
 
CHAPTER 5: POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 Conclusions and Potential Applications 
This research demonstrates that the relationships between mining companies and their 
stakeholders can strongly influence whether a mining venture is successful or not. As stakeholders 
become increasingly concerned about mining decision-making, the tools for evaluating mining 
projects must better incorporate stakeholder perspectives. Conventional mine planning and 
permitting evaluations currently undervalue stakeholder perspectives. These systems center 
around western scientific expertise, corporate perspectives on risk management, and financial 
valuations of mineral deposits as justifications as the drivers of “objective” decision making.  This 
dissertation supports the assertion that companies and regulators must better incorporate, 
stakeholders perspectives on mining, local environmental knowledge, and institutional trust in 
their analyses. This section summarizes the conclusions of each of the dissertation’s research 
questions. 
How can governments better integrate local communities’ perceptions and concerns into 
mine permitting decisions?  
The study of Donlin in Chapter 2 found that the Army Corps of Engineers employed 
conventional public comment periods and also included Alaskan Native tribes as cooperating 
agencies in the NEPA process. These stakeholder consultation methods had some successes. For 
example, cooperating agency tribes were able to push for examination and disclosure of some of 
their environmental concerns. But, the study also highlighted divergent goals within NEPA 
between informing specific federal permitting actions and the wider mandate for environmental 
impact disclosure. Cooperating agency tribes were frustrated with NEPA’s inability to transform 
findings related to their concerns into enforceable protections when they fell into the latter 
category.  
This study concludes that the technocratic approaches to project evaluation favored by 
companies and regulators around the world can limit local stakeholder involvement in mining 
decision-making process. These approaches elevate the role of highly educated experts, many of 
whom lack personal connections to the people and environmental conditions at the subject mining 
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property. When decision-making methods limit the inclusion of local stakeholders’ voices, they 
risk ignoring important stakeholder concerns. Undervaluing these concerns forces stakeholders to 
express their concerns through extralegal mechanisms like company-stakeholder conflict.  
This study concludes that in order to address these problems, government regulators must 
adapt their processes to evaluate local stakeholder concerns in early project decision-making. This 
includes making more space in permitting processes for including local environmental knowledge 
and elevating that knowledge alongside the findings of external subject matter experts. Achieving 
this goal will require regulators to focus on building trust with local stakeholders early in the 
impact assessment process. 
What are the most important indicators of company-stakeholder conflict?  
The conflict modeling study in Chapter 3 presents a statistical examination of social and 
environmental variables’ relationships to company-stakeholder conflict. The chapter found that 
the following conditions were the best indicators of future company-stakeholder conflict: 1. 
Previous conflict between mining companies and stakeholders in the region, 2. Anticipated 
physical and economic displacement of stakeholders, and 3. The company-stakeholder conflict 
history at the subject property. These findings suggest that companies and governments should 
examine these conditions when attempting to compare conflict risk from one mining property to 
another.   
This study could not identify any environmental variables that were statistically significant 
indicators of conflict. This is probably because of the specific nature of the environmental variables 
and because of the small size of the database. However, the study concludes that how 
environmental conditions affect the unique social and economic conditions around each mining 
property likely play an important role in conflict. The findings suggest that evaluators should 
consider environmental conditions within a mining property’s specific socio-economic context, 
particularly how negative environmental conditions might impact local stakeholders economic and 
livelihood activities. 
How does stakeholder opposition affect the valuation of a mining property?  
The decision-tree model in Chapter 4 suggests a framework for translating company-
stakeholder conflict risk into financial implications for companies. This model overlays the 
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average frequency of a company-stakeholder conflict onto the project’s discounted cash flow 
model to determine the “risk cost” associated with stakeholder opposition. This study finds that 
even moderate levels of conflict result in the erosion of hundreds of millions of dollars in project 
value and that high levels of conflict can turn a financial asset into a liability. This study suggests 
that companies should allocate significant resources to addressing stakeholders’ concerns and 
thereby reducing the risks to their projects. Moreover, these findings suggest that investors should 
look critically at mining projects where there is social opposition. 
Collectively these three studies conclude that external stakeholders are undervalued by 
mining’s present decision-making paradigms. This dissertation calls on companies and 
governments to place a greater emphasis on external stakeholders’ perspectives on mining. It 
recommends that companies and governments engage these stakeholders in permitting and mine 
design processes such that these decisions include nuanced understandings of how a mine will 
affect local people and how those people will affect a mine. 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
This research raised several questions that the author was unable to pursue. This section 
discusses the most potentially impactful opportunities for future work. 
5.2.1 Continued Examination of Donlin 
Donlin remains compelling as a case of company-stakeholder relationships. The present 
study tracked Donlin through the completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, but the Donlin story is continuing to evolve. Although the NEPA process is complete, the 
impacts of the NEPA process are yet to be fully determined. Many local stakeholders who were 
involved in the NEPA process remain frustrated with the process, government regulators, and the 
Donlin Gold company. In the 2-year period between the author’s field work in the Kuskokwim 
Valley and the completion of this dissertation, Donlin Gold has received most of the permits it 
needs to advance the project. In that same period, the mine’s opponents have become more 
organized and vocal. Other scholarly work suggests that the feasibility stage is the highest-risk 
period for company-stakeholder conflict (Davis & Franks, 2014). In addition, the last publicly-
available cash flow for Donlin (NovaGold Resources, 2011) suggests that the project is only 
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marginally economic, even without stakeholder opposition. This set of conditions presents a 
compelling case for further work. Some questions include: 
• How will the recent increase in stakeholder opposition to the Donlin mine affect the 
company’s decision whether to advance the mine to the construction stage? 
• What will be the lasting legacies of the NEPA process at Donlin? Will stakeholders’ 
concerns about issues like the degradation of rainbow smelt populations come to fruition? 
If so, will these impacts motivate additional conflict? Or, will opposition to the mine fade 
as the project advances? 
• What elements of NEPA at Donlin will permitting agencies choose to continue in other 
locations? Will agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers continue to view Alaskan 
Native and American Indian tribes as potential cooperating agencies? Will the public 
consultation processes in NEPA evolve from the one-way public comment model to 
something closer to the collaborative workshop that some of this study’s interviewees 
recommended? 
It was tempting throughout this study to compare Donlin to the case of Pebble. Pebble is 
located approximately 200 miles to the south and is one of the most controversial mining projects 
in the world. Compared to Pebble, Donlin has not seen the same quantity of local nor international 
opposition. The opportunity for a comparative study of Donlin and Pebble is ripe, especially as 
Donlin appears to be advancing and Pebble remains stalled. A comparative study could address 
some of these questions: 
• Why are the apparent outcomes at Donlin and Pebble so different? What are the key 
differences between these projects? 
• How has the relatively high level of opposition at Pebble and the lower level of opposition 
at Donlin affected the market’s valuation of these properties? 
• How do stakeholders’ attitudes towards NEPA differ at each property? Do Pebble 




5.2.2 Refining the Conflict Risk Model 
The company-stakeholder conflict risk model presented in Chapter 3 is a unique attempt to 
develop a statistical tool for evaluating conflict indicators at a mining property. This study 
identified some of the most important variables that may predict company-stakeholder conflict. 
Yet, there remains significant potential to refine this tool, improve its predictive power, and 
evaluate a wider selection of variables. The model in this study was built using only 23 mining 
properties, and all of the social and environmental variables were evaluated by a single company. 
The most obvious opportunity for improvement is to expand the database to include a greater 
number of properties, and companies. With a larger database, future researchers may be able to 
quantitatively examine a wider variety of variables, attempt more complex models, and move from 
models that evaluate the important conflict indicators to one which could serve to predict conflict 
within a more useful range of error. For example: 
• This study’s database did not have enough properties to test the relationship of project stage 
to conflict. Could a larger statistical analysis confirm the findings of Davis and Franks 
(2014) that early-stage projects are at higher risk for conflict? 
• The relationship between environmental variables and conflict could be tested further. 
Although the present study included environmental variables, the small size of the dataset 
may have masked the effects of individual environmental conditions.  
5.2.3 Improving the Social Risk Decision Tree Model 
The social conflict valuation model presented in this dissertation is a tool to help companies 
and investors evaluate the financial value of company-stakeholder conflict risk in a proposed 
mining project. Using this approach, the proposed research provides a method that avoids the 
cumbersome and subjective weaknesses of approaches like the IFC’s FV Tool (International 
Finance Corporation, 2017), while expanding upon Davis and Frank’s (2014) work to integrate 
site-specific conditions into mine valuation.  
However, project suspension is not the only cost associated with poor company-
stakeholder relationships. Some costs occur even in the absence of major conflict events. These 
costs might include reputational costs, stock price erosion, short-term production losses, and others 
101 
 
(Davis & Franks, 2014). As scholars begin to better understand these other costs and how they are 
triggered, the model proposed here could be expanded to include them. For example: 
• How does the outbreak of a conflict affect a property’s valuation in equity markets? If the 
effects are lasting, could these outcomes be included in the model? 
• How could the model be adapted to account for shorter-term project delays which do not 
force a company to walk away from a property indefinitely? 
• Are there costs when stakeholders distrust a company, even if that distrust does not ever 
manifest in outward conflict? 
• The conclusions of this study’s conflict modeling work suggest that company-stakeholder 
conflicts have elements of self-perpetuation (i.e. having a conflict history indicates that 
future conflict is more likely). How does the transition from no conflict to having a single 
conflict affect future mining outcomes? 
5.3 Final Thoughts  
As with any research project, this one is influenced by my own past experiences, 
perspectives and biases. I am the product of a western engineering education, a career working for 
mining companies, and world view that values the benefits of liberal economics. I hail from a rural 
American upbringing that was not influenced by the benefits nor costs of nearby mineral resource 
development. Although I have striven mightily to temper my biases throughout the work; and owe 
enormous debt to my advisor, many stakeholders in the Kuskokwim region, and others for help in 
this regard, I know that these influences are powerful and cannot be completely expunged.  
Some people will disagree with my interpretations and conclusions throughout this 
dissertation. In the Donlin case study specifically, many people expressed these disagreements to 
me directly when I shared early drafts of that chapter with them. One of my primary aims of the 
subsequent revisions was to better capture these views while remaining true to different 
perspectives from other interviewees. I am hopeful that at the very least, those that dislike my 
findings see this work as an honest attempt to tell the Donlin story. I also expect that some readers 
of the later chapters will find my statistical modeling and the financial valuation of people’s 
complex feelings, cultures, and perceptions as insensitive, if not entirely heartless. I see and feel 
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these problems too. As I wrote these chapters, I reflected on the many people I know who live in 
mine-proximate communities, many of whom feel negative impacts from mining every day. I am 
hopeful that my work contributes to the betterment of their lives by shining a light upon the costs 
and risks that companies and governments shoulder when they ignore or undervalue those 
stakeholders’ experiences. I am hopeful that this work prods companies to more seriously consider 
the implications of investing in controversial mineral properties and thereby avoid conflict. 
This work aims to uncover some of the mystery surrounding stakeholders’ growing 
influence on mining projects and their opposition to many of them. I am hopeful that this work 
convinces some people that company-stakeholder conflict is not abstract, it is not random, it is 
likely predictable, and even preventable. At the very least, this work demonstrates that these 
relationships are important at all intellectual levels: from the theoretical perspective of alternate 
project valuation methods, to the management of a company portfolio, to the permitting process 
of an individual mine, to the views and lived experiences of individual people. If nothing else, I 
am hopeful that the reader comes away from reading this dissertation with an appreciation for the 
scale of these challenges, the importance of these challenges to our global society, and the 







Adler, R. A., Claasen, M., Godfrey, L. & Turton, A. R., 2007. Water, mining, and waste: An 
historical and economic perspective on conflict managment in South Africa. The Economics of 
Peace and Security Journal 2, pp. 33-41. 
Akpalu, W. & Parks, P. J., 2007. Natural resource use conflict: Gold mining in tropical rainforst 
in Ghana. Environmental and Development Economics 12, pp. 55-72. 
Allison III, J. R., 2015. Sovereignty for Survival: American Engery Development and Indian Self-
Determination. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Anders, G. C. & Anders, K. K., 1986. Incompatible Goals in Unconventional Organization: The 
Politics of Alaskan Native Corporations. Organization Studies, pp. 213-233. 
Arellano-Yanguas, J., 2011. Aggravating the resource curse: Decentralisation, Mining and 
Conflict in Peru. Journal of Development Studies 47, pp. 617-638. 
Associated Press, 2009. Anchorage Daily News: Class ring makers join boycott against Pebble 
Mine - PRICELESS PROPERTY: Environmental concerns outweigh need for gold.. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/12B1AFDEAFA36B58?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Associated Press, 2019. Anchorage Daily News: Alaska Village Council Association Withdraws 
Support for Proposed Gold Mine. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2019/09/26/alaska-village-council-
association-withdraws-support-for-proposed-gold-mine/ 
[Accessed 21 December 2019]. 
Avci, D. & Fernandez-Salvador, C., 2016. Territorial dynamics and local resistance: Two mining 
conflicts in Ecuador compare. The Extractive Industries and Society 3, pp. 912-921. 
Aydin, C. I., Ozkaynak, B., Rodriguez-Labajos, B. & Yenilmez, T., 2017. Network Effects in 
Environmental Justice Struggles: An Investigation of Conflicts Between Mining Companies and 
Civil Society Organizations from a Network Perspective. PloS One 12, p. e0180494. 
Banerjee, S. B., 2000. Whose Land Is It Anyway? National Interest, Indigenous Stakeholders, and 
Colonial Discourses: The Case of the Jabiluka Uranium Mine. Organization and Environment 13, 
pp. 3-38. 
Barnsley, W., 2018. Adani to Make Indigenous Opponent Pay Legal Costs. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/politics/queensland/adani-to-make-indigenous-
opponent-pay-legal-costs-20181229-p50oqi.html 
[Accessed 8 March 2020]. 
Barrick Gold Corporation, 2018. The New Value Champion: Annual Report, Toronto, Canada: s.n. 
104 
 
BBC News, 2012. Peru Anit-Mine Protest Crackdown. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-18245875/peru-anti-mine-
protest-crackdown 
[Accessed 8 March 2020]. 
Bebbington, A. & Williams, M., 2008. Water and Mining Conflicts in Peru. Mountain Research 
and Development 28, pp. 190-196. 
Black, F. & Scholes, M., 1973. The Pricing of Options And Corporate Liabilities. Journal of 
Political Economy 81.1, pp. 637-654. 
Blevins, J., 2016. Crested Butte celebrates as longest running mine battle in the west nears end. 
[Online]  
Available at: https://www.denverpost.com/2016/10/01/crested-butte-longest-running-mine-battle/ 
[Accessed 30 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2007. Anchorage Daily News: Bristol Bay residents submit petition for vote on 
Pebble - CLEAN WATER: Three present list of signatures to challenge mining. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/118C6F3612EFBB88?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2008a. Anchorage Daily News: Neither side can agree on what Ballot Measure 4 
says, will do - Proposed mining law goes before voters. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/122B8B3F2A5C0650?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2008b. Anchorage Daily News: Vote shows which rural areas back mining - 
MEASURE 4: Support for initiative was in Bristol Bay and Bethel. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/122DD9DCAF0CE818?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2008c. Anchorage Daily News: Pebble prospect mining interests fund endowment - 
$5 MILLION: Money to be used for fisheries and economic development. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/11EFFBFAB5D6E1F8?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2008d. Anchorage Daily News: Jewelers announce opposition to Pebble prospect's 
'dirty gold' - Companies call for protection of river drainages. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/11ED049C4F68EE58?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
105 
 
Bluemink, E., 2009. Achorage Daily News: Suit filed to halt Pebble - Permit Process: Group says 
state didn't allow public input on giant mining prospect. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/129CEC3DC9E737A0?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Bluemink, E., 2010. Anchorage Daily News: Legality of Pebble work questioned in court - CIVIL 
TRIAL: State issued permits without public input, plaintiffs say. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/1340155EB1CE80E8?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Bone, J., 2012. The Deregulation Ethic and the Conscience of Capitalism: How the Neoliberal 
‘Free Market’ Model Undermines Rationality and Moral Conduct. Globalizations 9, pp. 651-665. 
Boutelier, R. G. & Thomson, I., 2011. Modeling and Measuring the Social License to Operate: 
Fruits of Dialogue Between Theory and Practice. International Mine Management, July.  
Cambell, G. & Roberts, M., 2010. Permitting a New Mine: Insights from the Community Debate. 
Resources Policy 35, pp. 210-217. 
Caroll, A. B., 1991. The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral 
Management of Organizational Stakeholders. Business Horizons, Issue July-August, pp. 39-48. 
Carstens, J. & Hilson, G., 2009. Mining, grievance and conflict in rural Tanzania. International 
Development Planning Review 31, pp. 301-326. 
Cashmore, M., Richardson, T., Hilding-Ryedvik, T. & Emmelin, L., 2010. Evaluating the 
effectiveness of impact assessment instruments: Theorising the nature and implications of their 
political constitution. Environmental Impact Assessment Review 30, pp. 371-379. 
CNBC, 2013. U.S. Energy Corp. to Post Its Mount Emmons Mine Plan of Operations on Its 
Website. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/id/100690612 
[Accessed 30 January 2019]. 
Cockerham, S., 2011. Anchorage Daily News: Voters approve anti-Pebble initiative by 34 votes - 
Court Next: Lake and Peninsula Borough law will be challenged. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/13A78F9A5B67F208?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 14 January 2019]. 
Cockerham, S., 2013. Anchorage Daily News: Anglo American Pulls Out of Proposed Pebble 
Mine. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.adn.com/economy/article/anglo-american-pulls-out-proposed-pebble-
mine/2013/09/16/ 
[Accessed 8 February 2020]. 
106 
 
Cohen, J., 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. 2nd ed. New York: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A., 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
pp. 563-595. 
Conde, M., 2017. Resistance to Mining. A Review. Ecological Economics 132, pp. 80-90. 
Conway, P., 1994. IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact. Journal of Development 
Economics, pp. 365-391. 
Cooney, J., 2017. Social License to Operate - Jim Cooney. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NkQMq0gIEYU 
[Accessed 11 October 2017]. 
Costanza, J. N., 2016. Mining conflict and the politics of obtaining a social license: Insight from 
Guatemala. World Development 79, pp. 97-113. 
Coumans, C., 2011. Whose Development? Mining, Local Resistance, and Development Agendas. 
In: Goverance Ecosystems. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 114-132. 
Council on Environmental Quality, 2019. Length of Environmental Impact Statements (2013-
2017), Washington, DC: s.n. 
Crested Butte News, 2016. Memorandum of Understanding for Mt. Emmons. [Online]  
Available at: http://crestedbuttenews.com/2016/02/memorandum-of-understanding-for-mt-
emmons/ 
[Accessed 30 January 2019]. 
Dashwood, H. S., 2012. The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility: Mining and the Spread of 
Global Norms. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Davis, G. A., 2001. One Project, Two Discount Rates. Business Valuation Review 20.1, pp. 18-23. 
Davis, G. A. & Tilton, J. E., 2005. The Resource Curse. Natural Resources Forum, Volume 29, 
pp. 233-242. 
Davis, R. & Franks, D., 2014. Cost of Company-Community Conflict in the Extractive Sector, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School. 
DeMarban, A., 2018a. Anchorage Daily News: Pebble protesters rally in Anchorage as Army 
Corps gets input on environmental review - It was the biggest protest since Pebble Limited 




[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
DeMarban, A., 2018b. Anchorage Daily News: After a year of debate and millions spent on the 
campaign, Alaska voters will decide Stand for Salmon measure - Supporters say Ballot Measure 
107 
 
1 will protect fishing and industry projects. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/16F6883BB5BDB4A8?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Demer, L., 2013. Anchorage Daily News: Legal fees spur protest. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/149A77FAB738A860?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Demer, L., 2014. Anchorage Daily News: Judge Tosses Ballot Measure Attempting to Block 
Pebble Mine. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/14CB3F7BD168C1B0?p=AWNB 
[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Demer, L., 2017. Anchorage Daily News: Where are the kings? Kuskokwim River may see its worst 
run on record. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-alaska/2017/06/22/where-are-the-kings-
kuskokwim-river-may-see-its-worst-run-on-record/ 
[Accessed 4 March 2019]. 
Dixit, A., 2001. Investment and Hysteresis. In: Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty. 
Cambridge Massachusetts & London, UK: MIT Press, pp. 153-178. 
Dongoske, K. E., Pasqual, T. & King, T. F., 2015. Environmental Reviews and Case Studies: The 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Silencing of Native American Worldviews. 
Environmental Practice 17, pp. 36-45. 
Downing, T. E., 2002. Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement, 
International Institute for Environment and Development / World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development. 
Dreyfus, D. A. & Ingram, H. M., 1976. The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent 
and Practice. Natural Resources Journal, Issue April, pp. 243-262. 
Eilperin, J. & Dennis, B., 2018. Washington Post: In reversal, EPA deals setback to controversial 




[Accessed 18 January 2019]. 
Els, F., 2011. Peru Declares State of Emergency Over Cajamarca Gold Mine Protests. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.mining.com/peru-declares-state-of-emergency-over-cajamarca-gold-
mine-protests/ 
[Accessed 11 February 2020]. 
108 
 
Environmental Law Institute, 2004. Judging NEPA: A "Hard Look" at Judical Decison Making 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, s.l.: Environmental Law Institute. 
Environmental Resources Management, 2016. New Realities Facing the Mining and Metals 
Industry, s.l.: ERM. 
Equator Principles, 2020. EP4: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and 
Managing Environmental and Social Risk in Projects, s.l.: s.n. 
Espinoza, D. & Morris, J. W., 2013. Decoupled NPV: A Simple, Improved Method to Value 
Infrastructure Investments. Construction Management and Economics, 31(5), pp. 471-496. 
Espinoza, R. D. & Rojo, J., 2015. Using DNPV for valuting investments in the energy sector: A 
solar project case study. Renewable Energy, Volume 75, pp. 44-49. 
Evans, R. & Kemp, D., 2011. Community Issues. In: SME Mining Engineering Handbook. 
Lakewood, Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration, pp. 1767-1777. 
Franks, D., 2009. Avoiding Mine-Community Conflict: From Dialogue to Shared Futures. 
Santiago, Chile, s.n. 
Freeport McMoRan, 2017. Sustainability, Communities, Indonesia. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.fcx.com/sustainability/communities/community-investment/indonesia 
[Accessed 14 December 2017]. 
Friedman, M., 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. The New York 
Times Manazine, 13 September.  
Gentry, D. W. & O'Neil, T. J., 1984. Accounting for Risk in Mining Investments. In: Mine 
Valuation Analysis. New York: Society of Mining Engineers, pp. 375-390. 
Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B. & Hansen, J. M., 2009. The Relationship Between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the Risk Management Hypothesis. 
Strategic Management Journal 30, pp. 425-445. 
Gold Fields, Ltd, 2011. Annual Report, Johannesburg, South Africa: Gold Fields, Ltd. 
Haarstad, H. & Floysand, A., 2007. Globalization and the power of rescaled narratives: A case of 
opposition to mining in Tambogrande, Peru. Political Geography 26, pp. 289-308. 
Hanks, E. H. & Hanks, J. L., 1970. An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Rutgers Law Review, Issue 230, pp. 230-272. 
Hanna, P., Vanclay, F., Langdon, E. J. & Arts, J., 2014. Improving the Effectiveness of Impact 
Assessment Pertaining to Indigenous Peoples in the Brazilian Environmental Licensing Procedure. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, pp. 58-67. 
Haslam, P. A. & Tanimoune, N. A., 2016. The Determinants of Social Conflict in the Latin 




Hentschel, T., Hruschka, F. & Priester, M., 2002. Global Report on Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining, London: International Institute for Environment and Development and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development. 
Herz, S., Genovese, K., Herbertson, K. & Perrault, A., 2008. The International Finance 
Corporation's Performance Standards and the Equator Principles: Respecting Human Rights and 
Remedying Violations?, s.l.: Center for International Environmental Law, Bank Information 
Center, BankTrack, Oxfam Australia, World Resources Institute. 
Hilson, G. & Yakovleva, N., 2007. Strained relations: A critical analysis of the mining conflict in 
Prestea, Ghana. Political Geolography 26, pp. 98-119. 
Holden, W. N. & Jacobson, R. D., 2007. Mining amid armed conflict: nonferrous metals mining 
in the Philippines. The Canadian Geographer 51, pp. 475-500. 
Holland, N., 2017. Mine of the Future. Johannesburg, Gold Fields, Ltd.. 
Holley, E. A. & Mitcham, C., 2016. The Pebble Mine Dialogue: A Case Study in Public 
Engagement and the Social License to Operate. Resources Policy 47, pp. 18-27. 
Humphreys, D., 2000. A Business Perspective on Community Relations in Mining. Resources 
Policy, pp. 127-131. 
ICMM, 2018. Performance Expectations, s.l.: International Council on Mining and Metals. 
International Council on Mining and Metals, 2003. ICMM Sustainable Development Framework: 
ICMM Principles, s.l.: s.n. 
International Council on Mining and Metals, 2012. Community Development Toolkit, London, 
UK: s.n. 
International Council on Mining and Metals, 2015. Research on Company-Community Conflict, 
London: s.n. 
International Finance Corporation, 2006. International Finance Corporation’s Performance 
Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability , Washington, DC: IFC. 
International Finance Corporation, 2007. Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook 
for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets, Washington, D.C.: s.n. 
International Finance Corporation, 2012. Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability, s.l.: s.n. 
International Finance Corporation, 2014. A Strategic Approach to Early Stakeholder Engagement: 
A Good Practice Handbook for Junior Companies in the Extractive Industries, Washington, D.C.: 
s.n. 




Available at: https://www.fvtool.com/ 
[Accessed 18 December 2017]. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2002. Breaking New Ground: Mining, 
Minerals, and Sustainable Development; The Report of the MMSD Project, s.l.: Earthscan. 
Jamasmie, C., 2014. One Dead, 20 Hurt in Protests Against Copper Mine in Myanmar. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.mining.com/one-dead-20-hurt-in-protests-against-copper-mine-in-
myanmar-76686/ 
[Accessed 8 March 2020]. 
Jamasmie, C., 2015. Over $21bn worth of mining projects delayed in Peru due to social conflict. 
Mining.com, 8 October.  




[Accessed 11 February 2020]. 
Jaskoski, M., 2014. Environmental licensing and conflict in Peru's mining sector: A path-
dependent analysis. World Development 64, pp. 873-883. 
Jenkins, H., 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility and the Mining Industry: Conflicts and 
Constructs. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 11, pp. 23-34. 
Karnowski, S., 2018. Twin Cities Pioneer Press: Environmentalists go to court to fight PolyMet 
mine permits. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.twincities.com/2018/12/03/environmentalists-go-to-court-to-fight-
polymet-mine-permits/ 
[Accessed 14 December 2018]. 
Kirsch, S., 2014. Mining Capitalism: The Relationship Between Corporations and Their Critics. 
Oakland, California: University of California Press. 
Lane, M. B. & Corbett, T., 2005. The tyranny of localism: Indigenous participation in community-
based environmental management. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 7, pp. 141-159. 
Langberg, S., 2014. A "Full and Fair" Discussion of Environmental Impacts in NEPA EISs: The 
Case for Addressing the Impacts of Substantive Regulatory Regimes. Yale Law Journal, pp. 716-
756. 
Lassonde, P., 1994. The Gold Book: The Complete Investment Guide to Precious Metals. Toronto, 
Canada: Penguin Books & The Financial Times. 
Lawrence, D. P., 2013. Impact Assessment: Practical Solutions to Recurrent Problems and 
Contemporary Challenges. 2nd ed. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
111 
 
Li, F., 2015. Unearthing Conflict: Corporate Mining, Activism, and Experience in Peru. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press. 
Loayza, N., Mier y Teran, A. & Rigolini, J., 2013. Poverty, Inequality, and the Local Natural 
Resource Curse, s.l.: The World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. 
Lowe, M. E., 2010. Contemporary Rural-Urban Migration in Alaska. Alaska Journal of 
Anthropology, 8(2), pp. 75-92. 
Lukic, J., Jones, V. N. & Bhalla, A., 2011. Valuing Returns on Sustainability Investments: Linking 
Local Impact and Business Value. Santiago, Chili, International Seminar on Social Resposibility 
in Mining. 
MacArthur, A. R., 2018. KYUK: Regulators release 10,000-page environmental document on 
proposed Donlin mine. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ktoo.org/2018/04/28/regulators-release-10000-page-environmental-
document-on-proposed-donlin-mine/ 
[Accessed 30 April 2019]. 
Mahanty, S. & McDermott, C. L., 2013. How Does 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent' (FPIC) 
Impact Social Inequality? Lessons from Mining and Forestry and Their Implications for REDD+. 
Land Use Policy 35, pp. 406-416. 
Mandelker, D. R., 2010. The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and 
Problems. Journal of Law & Policy, Volume 32, pp. 293-312. 
Martin, T., Rodriguez, M. C. & Mendex-Montalvo, M., 2016. Tragadero Grande: Land, human 
rights, and international standards in the conflict between the Chaupe family and Minera 
Yanacocha, Washington, DC: Resolve. 




[Accessed 8 March 2020]. 
Mitchell, P., 2019. Top 10 Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.ey.com/en_gl/mining-metals/10-business-risks-facing-mining-and-
metals 
[Accessed 15 December 2019]. 
Montrie, C., 2003. To Save the Land and People: A History of Opposition to Surface Coal Mining 
in Appalachia. The University of North Carolina Press: s.n. 
Morgan, R. M., 2012. Environmental Impact Assessment: The State of the Art. Impact 
Assessments and Project Appraisal, 30(1), pp. 5-14. 
112 
 
Murphy, J. M. et al., 2017. Juvenile Chinook Salmon abundance in the northern Bering Sea: 
Implications for future returns and fisheries in the Yukon River. Deep-Sea Research II, Volume 
135, pp. 156-167. 
National Environmental Policy Act, 1969. Public Law. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. s.l.:s.n. 
Newmont Mining, 2015. Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1164727/000155837016003258/nem-
20151231x10k.htm 
Newmont Mining, 2015. Gary Goldberg Talks Sustainability: A Core Part of Newmont's Strategy 
and Values. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.newmont.com/newsroom/newsroom-details/2015/Gary-Goldberg-
Talks-Sustainability--A-Core-Part-of-Newmonts-Strategy-and-Values/default.aspx 
[Accessed 11 October 2017]. 
Northern Dynasty Minerals, 2011. Northern Dynasty Receives Positive Preliminary Assessment 
Technical Report for Globally Significant Pebble Copper-Gold-Molybdenum Project in Southwest 
Alaska. [Online]  
Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1164771/000106299311000722/exhibit99-1.htm 
[Accessed 15 January 2019]. 
NovaGold Resources, 2011. Donlin Creek Gold Project, s.l.: s.n. 
NovaGold Resources, 2018. Annual Report, Vancouver, Canada: s.n. 
Okoh, G. A., 2014. Greivence and conflict in Ghana's gold mining industry: The case of Obuasi. 
Futures 62, pp. 51-57. 
Oswalt, W. H., 1990. Bashful No Longer: An Eskimo Enthohistory, 1778-1988. Norman and 
London: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Owen, J. R. & Kemp, D., 2015. Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: A Critical 
Appraisal. Journal of Cleaner Production 87, pp. 478-488. 
Owen, J. R. & Kemp, D., 2017. Extractive Relations: Countervailing Power and the Global 
Mining Industry. New York: Routledge. 
Oxfam America, 2009. Mining Conflicts in Peru: Condition Critical, Boston: s.n. 
Perrott-Humphrey, F., 2011. Market Capitalization. In: P. Darling, ed. SME Mining Engineering 
Handbook, 3rd Edition. Englewood, Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, 
pp. 65-71. 
Phadke, R., 2018. Green energy futures: Responsible mining on Minnesota's Iron Range. Energy 
Research & Social Science, Volume 35, pp. 163-173. 
113 
 
Prno, J., 2013. An analysis of factors leading to the establishment of a social license to operate in 
the mining industry. Resources Policy 38, pp. 577-590. 
Que, S. & Awuah-Offei, K., 2014. Identifying Critical Factors That Influence Community 
Acceptance of Mining Projects. Salt Lake City, Utah, Society for Mining, Metallurgy and 
Exploration. 
Raufflet, E., Cruz, L. B. & Bres, L., 2014. An Assessment of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Practices in the Mining and Oil and Gas Industries. Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 256-270. 
Reporters Without Borders, 2019. Press Freedom Index. [Online]  
Available at: https://rsf.org/ 
[Accessed 3 April 2020]. 
Rio Tinto, 2011. Survey on Stakeholder Engagement, London: s.n. 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens (1989).  
Ross, M. L., 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics 51, pp. 297-322. 
Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M., 2001. The Curse of Natural Resources. European Economic Review, 
pp. 827-838. 
Schwartz, E. S. & Trigeorgis, L., 2001. Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: An 
Overview. In: Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent 
Contributions. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, UK: MIT Press, pp. 1-16. 
Shallenberger, K., 2018. Alaska Public Media: First Y-K Delta Tribe Marches Against Donlin 
Gold in Bethel. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.alaskapublic.org/2018/06/27/first-y-k-delta-tribe-marches-against-
donlin-gold-in-bethel/ 
[Accessed 26 November 2019]. 
Shallenberger, K., 2018. KYUK: Bethel ONC Tribe Passes Resolution Supporting Salmon Ballot 
Initiative. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.kyuk.org/post/bethel-onc-tribe-passes-resolution-supporting-salmon-
habitat-ballot-initiative 
[Accessed 23 April 2019]. 
Shimbar, A. & Ebrahimi, S. B., 2017. Modified-Decoupled Net Present Value: The Intersection of 
Valuation and Time Scaling of Risk in Energy Sector. Environmental Energy and Economic 
Research, 1(4), pp. 347-362. 
Smith, N. J. & Liller, Z. W., 2018. 2017 Kuskokwim River Chinook Salmon Run Reconstruction 
and 2018 Forecast, Anchorage: Alaska Department of Fish and Game. 
Smith, N. M., Smith, J. M., John, Z. Q. & Teschner, B. A., 2017. Promises and preceptions in the 




SNL Metals & Mining, 2015. Permitting, Economic Value and Mining in the United States, 
London, UK: The National Mining Association. 
Snyder, S., 2014. Bristol Bay Wild Salmon, Pebble Mine, and Intractable Conflict: Lessons for 
Environmental Studies and Sciences. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable 
Development, 52(2), pp. 17-26. 




Stark, J., Li, J. & Terasawa, K., 2006. Environmental Safeguards and Community Benefits in 
Mining: Recent Lessons from the Philippines, Falls Church, Virginia: USAID and Foundation for 
Environmental Security & Sustainability. 
Switzer, J. V., 1997. Green Backlash: The History and Politics of Environmental Opposition in 
the U.S.. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado. 
Temper, L. & Martinez-Alier, J., 2013. The god of the mountain and Godavarman: Net present 
value, indigenous territorial rights and sacredness in a bauxite mining conflict in India. Ecological 
Economics 96, pp. 79-87. 
Terminski, B., 2013. Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical 
Frameworks and Current Challenges, Geneva, Switzerland: s.n. 
Teschner, B., 2013. How you start matters: A comparison of Gold Fields' Tarkwa and Damang 
mines and their divergent relationships with local small-scale miners in Ghana. Resources Policy 
38, pp. 332-340. 
Teschner, B. & Holley, E., 2019. The cost of mine suspension from social conflict: A decision tree 
model. Resources Policy, p. 101443. 
The Midnight Sun, 2018. There are five companies that have each spent more than $1 million 
opposing the salmon initiative: State of the Race. [Online]  
Available at: http://midnightsunak.com/2018/08/09/there-are-five-companies-that-have-each-
spent-more-than-1-million-opposing-the-salmon-initiative-state-of-the-race/ 
[Accessed 23 April 2019]. 
Thomson, I. & Boutilier, R. G., 2011. Social License to Operate. In: SME Mining Engineering 
Handbook. Littleton, Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration, pp. 1779-1796. 
Tiernan, A., Lipka, C. & Smith, N., 2018. Kuskokwim River Salmon Stock Status and Kuskokwim 
Area Fisheries, 2019: A Report to the Alaska Board of FIsheries, Anchorage: Alaska Department 
of Fish and Game. 
Trench, A., Packey, D. & Sykes, J. P., 2014. Non-Technical Risk and Their Impact on the Mining 
Industry. Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve Estimation, pp. 605-617. 
115 
 
Tschakert, P., 2009. Recognizing and Nurturing Artisnal Mining as a Livelihood. Resources Policy 
34, pp. 24-31. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2013. Donlin Gold Project Environmental Impact Statement FInal 
Scoping Report, Anchorage, AK: URS Alaska, LLC. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2018. Donlin Gold Project Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
Jber, Alaska: s.n. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2017. Bethel Census Area, Alaska. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/bethelcensusareaalaska 
[Accessed 11 December 2018]. 
U.S. Council on Enviromental Quality, 2007. Collaboration in NEPA: A Handbook for NEPA 
Practitioners. Washington, DC: s.n. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2014. Proposed Determination of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency Region 10 Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act, Pebble Deposit 
Area, Southwest Alaska, Seattle, Washington: Region 10. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012. Regional Alaskan Native Corporations: Status 40 
Years after Establishment, and Future Considerations, s.l.: s.n. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014. National Environmental Policy Act: Little 
Information Exists on NEPA Analyses, s.l.: GAO-14-369. 
United Nations Environmental Program, 2004. Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic 
Environmental Assessment: Towards an Integrated Approach, Geneva, Switzerland: UNEP. 
United Nations, 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
s.l.: sustainabledevelopment.un.org. 
United Nations, 2016. Paris Agreement, s.l.: United Nations Treaty Collection. 
Upton, M., 2016. Quantifying the Impact of Social License for Investment Descision-Making. 
Presented April 26, s.n. 
Urkidi, L., 2010. A global environmental movement against gold mining: Pascua-Lama in Chili. 
Ecological Economics 70, pp. 219-227. 
Visser, W., 2011. The Age of Reesponsibility: CSR 2.0 and the New DNA of Business. s.l.:Wiley. 
Vogel, D., 2005. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsbility. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Woods, C. S., 2014. It isn't a state problem: The Minas Conga mine controversy and the need for 
binding international obligations on corporate actors. Geo. J. Int'l L 46, p. 629. 
116 
 
World Bank, 2019. World Development Indicators. [Online]  
Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/ 
[Accessed 26 November 2019]. 
Wright, C., 2012. Global Banks, the Environment, and Human Rights: The Impact of the Equator 
Principles on Lending Policies and Practices. Global Environmental Politics 12, pp. 56-77. 
Yap, N. T., 1990. Round the peg or square the hole? Populists, technocrats and environmental 
assessment in third world countries. Impact Assessment 8, pp. 69-84. 
 
 
